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INTRODUCTION

A decade ago, an article in this law review explored why West Virginia's
civil justice system had developed a reputation as one in which defendants did
not get a fair shake. 1 State law was viewed as outside the mainstream as the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia issued liability-expanding rulings in
areas including premises liability, product liability, workers' compensation, and
damages. Individuals and businesses litigating in state courts also faced
procedural unfairness, such as the ability of lawyers to handpick favorable courts
in West Virginia to bring claims with little or no connection to the state. A threat
of unlimited punitive damage awards loomed with no right to appeal. In addition,
companies doing business in West Virginia were concerned that they could be
the next target of an attorney general enforcement action sparked and litigated
by private lawyers motivated by personal profit rather than publicly-employed
government attorneys sworn to represent the public interest.
For years, little changed. A survey of business executives and corporate
counsel conducted by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform consistently
ranked the Mountain State dead last or second to last of the states for the overall
fairness of its legal environment between 2002 and 2015.2 Since that time,
however, West Virginia has made significant strides to improve its legal climate,
prompting a revisiting of the earlier article.
This Article guides readers through the state's encouraging
transformation and highlights areas where it may continue this progress. Section

I
See Victor E. Schwartz, Sherman Joyce, & Cary Silverman, West Virginia as a Judicial
Hellhole: Why Businesses FearLitigatingin State Courts, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 757, 758 (2009).
2

See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2017 LAWSUIT CLIMATE SURVEY: RANKING

THE STATES 92 (2017) (indicating West Virginia ranked 49th or 50th for its overall liability climate
in each of ten surveys conducted between 2002 and 2015), https://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/uploads/pdfs/Harris-2017-Full-Report-with-Questionnaire-FINAL.pdf.
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I examines areas where West Virginia law fell out of the mainstream and how
the legislature responded between 2015 and 2018. Section II explores changes in
how the attorney general's office and other state agencies retain and oversee
outside counsel. Section III considers the path forward, providing
recommendations for five additional steps the legislators should consider to
further improve the state's legal climate. The Article concludes that West
Virginia has made significant progress in bringing state tort law into the
mainstream and that, as new areas of excessive liability or abuse emerge, the
legislature should maintain balance in the civil justice system.
H.

THE 2015-2018 CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMS

In 2014, a seismic shift in the West Virginia Legislature set the stage for
a four-year period in which nearly two dozen meaningful civil justice reforms
became law in the state. West Virginia Republicans saw "unprecedented gains"
during the 2014 general election, resulting in the W. Va. GOP winning control
of the House of Delegates for the first time in 83 years, and the state Senate
deadlocked in a 17-17 tie for the first time since 1912. 3 One day after
Republicans won control of the House of Delegates, Democratic State Senator
Daniel Hall switched parties, giving the W. Va. GOP control of the state Senate
as well.4
With Republicans in charge of the West Virginia Legislature for the first
time since the Great Depression, civil justice reforms topped the legislative
agenda of incoming Senate President Bill Cole and House of Delegates Speakerelect Tim Armstead.5 As the radio "dean" of West Virginia broadcasters, Hoppy
Kercheval noted at the time, "Republicans and business interests have been
pushing that agenda for years [in West Virginia], but now they finally have a
majority in the legislature to make it happen." 6 It is against this backdrop that the
Legislature passed more than a dozen civil justice reform measures during the

3
See Jared Hunt, Republicans Will ControlBoth Chambers of State Legislature, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/republicans-will-control-

see
both-chambers-of-state-legislature/article 27be 11 d8-79c9-567d-8308-2358d0c8777e.html;
also 93 W. VA. BLUE BOOK 510-11 (Clark S. Barnes ed., 2015-2016), http://
www.wvlegislature.gov/legisdocs/2016/BlueBook/0337_WVS_BlueBook.pdf.
4
See Reid Wilson, Party Switch Gives Republicans Control of West Virginia Senate, WASH.
POST (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/l1/05/party=
switch-gives-republicans-control-of-west-virginia-senate/?noredirect=on&utm-term
.d87fdd3827b7.
5
See Chris Dickerson, Tort Reform on GOP Legislative Agenda, W. VA. REc. (Dec. 24,
2014), https://wvrecord.com/stories/510588207-tort-reform-on-gop-legislative-agenda.
6
Hoppy Kercheval, Fight Over "JudicialHellhole" Brewing in Legislature, METRONEWS
(Dec. 23, 2014, 12:37 AM), http://wvmetronews.com/2014/12/23/fight-over-judicial-hellholebrewing-in-legislature/.
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2015 legislative session and additional significant reform measures in the three
years that followed.
West Virginia's recent civil justice reforms generally fall in three areas,
which are explored in the subsections below. First, the state addressed core areas
of tort law where the state had either fallen out of the mainstream or lagged
behind progress made in other states. Second, West Virginia responded to
documented abuses in the civil justice system, such as forum shopping and
"gotcha" litigation tactics. Third, the state brought rationality to damages,
addressing the lack of any reasonable constraint on punitive damage awards,
recovery of inflated medical expenses, extraordinary awards in employment
suits, and a judgment interest rate that significantly exceeded inflation.
A.

Moving West Virginia's Tort Liability Laws Into the Mainstream

Laws that fairly determine liability based on a person's responsibility for
an injury are critical to a well-functioning civil justice system. Recent changes
to West Virginia law advance this goal in the diverse areas of personal injury
litigation, product liability actions against manufacturers of prescription drugs
and retailers, premises liability claims against individuals who own or lease
property, and lawsuits brought by plaintiffs who have themselves engaged in
wrongful conduct.
1. Allocating Fault in Proportion to Responsibility
West Virginia has gradually transitioned from imposing full joint and
several liability on defendants to allocating fault in proportion to each
defendant's responsibility for a plaintiffs injury. It completed its transition to
several liability in 2015, 7 while codifying modified comparative fault and
clarifying that juries may consider the responsibility of all parties when
allocating fault.
In 1979, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals abandoned the
doctrine of contributory negligence to correct the "obvious injustice" of barring
a plaintiff from recovery "no matter how slight the plaintiff's negligence." 8 The
court replaced contributory negligence with comparative fault, under which the
jury allocates fault to each party and the plaintiffs damages are reduced in
proportion to his or her level of responsibility. 9 Under the rule as adopted by the
court, a plaintiff may recover so long as his or her level of fault does not equal

7
H.B. 2002, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (passed as Enrolled Committee Substitute
for H.B. 2002, Feb. 24, 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-13c (West 2018)).
8
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883-84 (W. Va. 1979).
9

See id.at 885.
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or exceed the combined negligence of the other parties involved in causing the
injury. 10 Most states follow a similar approach."
When the court moved from contributory negligence to modified
comparative fault-a change that favored plaintiffs while promoting personal
responsibility-it also considered, but rejected, a change in the law that would
apply principles of proportionality when deciding the liability of defendants. The
court held that its adoption of comparative fault had "no effect" on application
of joint and several liability, which allows a plaintiff to seek full recovery from
2
any party that was even minimally responsible for his or her injury. 1 Joint and
several liability encourages plaintiffs to target businesses they consider to have
"deep pockets," while settling with or not pursuing those with limited assets who
may be most responsible for an injury.
Over a quarter century later, the legislature began to correct this
imbalance. In 2005, the legislature limited joint liability against parties
minimally at fault (less than 30%).' 3 This threshold, while a positive shift, still
left many defendants subject to liability in excess of their responsibility and
imposed joint liability on more defendants than most other states with a similar
approach. '

4

Under the 2015 law, several liability is now the rule in West Virginia,
with individuals and businesses typically paying damages in proportion to their
level of responsibility for an injury. 15 If a party cannot collect the judgment from
a responsible party then, after a good faith effort to do so, the plaintiff can ask
the court to reallocate uncollectable shares of liable defendants among other
liable defendants in proportion to each party' s percentage of fault.' 6 A defendant
that is equally or less at fault than the plaintiff, however, is not subject to
10

See id.

I

See generally VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (5th ed. 2010).
Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 886.

12

13
S.B. 421, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2005) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-24(b))
(repealed 2015). The inclusion of a partial judicial reallocation of damages deemed "uncollectable"
to parties found to be more than 10% at fault also limited the efficacy of these reforms.
14
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 2018) (joint liability for economic damages when
50% or more at fault); MINN. STAT. § 604.02 Subdivision 1(1) (2018) (greater than 50%); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 537.067 (2018) (510% or more); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(2) (2018) (50% or
less); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 41.141 (West 2018) (not greater than plaintiffs fault) ; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507:7-e (2018) (greater than 50%); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West 2018) (60%
or more) ; N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 1601, 1602 (MCKINNEY 2018) (joint liability for economic damages
when more than 50% at fault); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.22 (West 2018) (joint liability for
economic damages when more than 50% at fault); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102
(West 2018) (not less than 60%); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15 (2018) (50% or more); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 15-8-15.1 (2018) (50% or more); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013 (West
2018) (greater than 50%); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045(1) (West 2018) (510% or more).
15
H.B. 2002, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (passed as Enrolled Committee Substitute
for H.B. 2002, February 24, 2005) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-13c(a), (b) (West 2018)).
16
Id. (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-13c(d) (West 2018)).
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reallocation. 17 The law retains limited exceptions where joint liability continues
to apply, such as where a defendant has engaged in conspiracy, driven under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, engaged in criminal conduct, or illegally disposed
of hazardous waste. 1 8 In adopting this law, West Virginia has joined 19 states
that have fully replaced joint liability with several liability or sharply limited
joint liability to narrow situations.1 9
The same legislation also codified modified comparative fault.20 What
the new law clarifies is that when juries allocate fault, they may consider the
responsibility of anyone that may have contributed to a plaintiff's injury, not just
those that happen to be present in court. 21 This approach recognizes that some
responsible people or entities may not be named as defendants in a lawsuit
because they have no resources to pay a judgment, have filed for bankruptcy, are
immune from suit, or for other reasons. As an authoritative treatise on tort law
recognizes, "the failure to consider the negligence of all tortfeasors, whether
parties or not, prejudices the joined defendants who are thus required to bear a
' 22
greater proportion of the plaintiff's loss than is attributable to their fault.
Before adoption of the 2015 law, West Virginia courts recognized that
juries may consider the fault of nonparties where evidence indicates shared
responsibility, but the ability and process for doing so was uncertain. The new
law provides clarity through adopting a procedure for a defendant to give fair

17

18

Id.
Id.(codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-13c(h) (West 2018)).

19

See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(d) (2018); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.

§

12-2506(A) (2018);

ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-201(b) (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (2018); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.81(1) (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33 (West 2018); IDAHO CODE § 6-803
(2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-7-1 (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (West 2018);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(3) (West 2018); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1804,2323,2324 (2018);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.6304(4), 600.6312 (West 2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7
(West 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 15 (West 2018);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-107 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-5-818, 78B-5-819 (West
2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (West 2018); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(e) (West 2018).
20
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-7-13a, 55-7-13c(c) (West 2018).
21

Id. § 55-7-13d(1) ("In assessing percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider the fault

of all persons who contributed to the alleged damages regardless of whether the person was or
could have been named as a party to the suit.").
22
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 475-76 (5th ed.
1984) (emphasis added).
23
See Modular Bldg. Consultants of W. Va., Inc. v. Poerio, Inc., 774 S.E.2d 555, 565-66 (W.
Va. 2015) ("[T]here is no per se ban on 'empty chair' arguments in West Virginia."); Syl. Pt. 2,
Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 558 S.E.2d 663, 667 (W. Va. 2001) ("It is improper for counsel to
make arguments to the jury regarding party's omission from a lawsuit or suggesting that the absent
party is solely responsible for the plaintiff's injury where the evidence establishing the absent
party's liability has not been fully developed.") (emphasis added); Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d
613, 621 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that properly calculating damages requires considering the fault
of anyone who may have caused an accident, not merely parties to the litigation).
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notice to a plaintiff that it plans to assert that a nonparty is wholly or partially at
fault for the plaintiff's injuries. 24 This law25is similar to how allocation of fault to
nonparties is treated in many other states.
2.

Adopting the Learned Intermediary Doctrine

State courts have "almost universally" recognized the learned
intermediary doctrine, which provides that a manufacturer of a prescription drug
or medical device fulfills its duty to warn by informing the prescribing physician
of a product's risks.26 This doctrine recognizes that doctors are in the best
position to communicate this information to patients based on each individual's
condition.27 For that reason, the doctrine does not require manufacturers to
directly communicate information about risks to patients.
In 2007, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals became the first
state high court in the nation to fully reject this doctrine. Its 3-2 decision in State
ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl reasoned that television advertising for
prescription drugs made the doctrine "outdated, ' 28 even as physicians continue
to play an indispensable role in a patient's decision to take medication and ability
to obtain it. The ruling opened the door to lawsuits against pharmaceutical
companies viewed as having deep pockets, while not providing better

24

S.B. 411, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-13d

(West 2018)).
Several states have adopted statutes explicitly permitting juries to allocate fault to
25
nonparties. Some state laws, like the new West Virginia law, provide a specific procedure for a
defendant to provide notice to the plaintiff of its intention to allocate fault to a nonparty. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (2018); FLA. STAT.

ANN. § 768.81(3) (West 2018); GA. CODEANN. § 51-12-33 (West 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-512 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.2957, 600.6304 (West 2018); TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.003, 33.004 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-818(2) (West 2018).
Other state statutes authorize allocation of fault to nonparties, but do not provide detailed
procedures for doing so. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323(A) (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
41-3A-l(B) (West 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (2018). In additional states, courts
interpret the law as permitting juries to allocate fault to nonparties. See, e.g., DaFonte v. Up-Right,
Inc., 828 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1992); Idaho Dep't of Labor v. Sunset Marts, Inc., 91 P.3d 1111 (Idaho
2004); Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978); Estate of Hunter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 729 So.
2d 1264 (Miss. 1999); Bode v. Clark Equip. Co., 719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1986).
In re Zimmer, 884 F.3d 746, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2018) (predicting the Wisconsin Supreme
26
Court would adopt the doctrine).
27

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.

1998).
28

State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 906 (W. Va. 2007),

superseded by statute, S.B. 15, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016) (codified at W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-7-30 (West 2018)).
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information
to patients. It was subject to heavy criticism and widely viewed as
29
an outlier.

The legislature overturned Karl in 2016.3o In doing so, West Virginia
joined every other state in adopting the learned intermediary doctrine. The new
law provides that a manufacturer or seller of a prescription drug or medical
device is not liable in a failure to warn claim unless it "acted unreasonably in
failing to provide reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks
of harm to prescribing or other health care providers who are in a position to
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings" and
where "[f]ailure 3 to
provide reasonable instructions or warnings was a proximate
1
cause of harm."

3. Limiting the Liability of Innocent Product Sellers
In July 2017, West Virginia joined the majority of states that have an
"innocent seller" law. 32 Until that time, any business in the chain of distribution
of a product-including businesses that merely sold a product in West Virginia
made by others-were liable to the same extent as the companies that designed,

29

See Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 P.3d 944, 950 (Ariz. 2016) ("No other court has

followed Karl, and several courts have criticized it."); Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140,
158 (Tex. 2012) (recognizing "[o]ur sister states have overwhelmingly adopted the learned
intermediary doctrine" and only West Virginia has "rejected the doctrine altogether," and
concluding "[t]he underlying rationale for the validity of the learned intermediary doctrine remains
just as viable today" as when first adopted); see also Kyle T. Fogt, The Road Less Traveled: West
Virginia's Rejection of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Age of Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising, 34 J. CORP. L. 587, 609 (2009) (characterizing Karl as "quite a departure from the
common law approach" and predicting other states will not follow the decision); Richard B. Goetz
& Karen R. Growdon, A Defense of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
421, 430 (2008) (observing Karl made no attempt to address the practical problems it raised);
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Marketing PharmaceuticalProducts in the Twenty-First Century: An
Analysis of the Continued Viability of Traditional Principles of Law in the Age of Direct-toConsumer Advertising, 32 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 333, 363-64 (2009) (rebutting statement in
Karl that courts had adopted a "plethora" of exceptions to the doctrine).
30
S.B. 15, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-30
(West 2018)).
31

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-30(a) (West 2018).

Twenty-four states had enacted innocent seller laws as of 2005. See Steven B. Hantler et al.,
Is the "Crisis" in the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1121, 1147
n. 112 (2005) (citing statutes). Since that time, several states, in addition to West Virginia, have
enacted similar laws. See, e.g., S.B. 184, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011) (amending ALA. CODE
§ 6-5-501 (2018)); H.B. 3365, 54th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2014) (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit.
76, § 57.2 (2018)); H.B. 2008, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (amending TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (West 2018)); S.B. 1, 2011 Leg., Jan. 2011 Spec. Sess. § 31 (Wis. 2011)
(codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.047(2), (3)(e) (West 2018).
32
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manufactured, and labeled them. 33 A retailer, for example, could be liable if it
sold a product in a closed box and had no reason to know the product was
defective.
The new law provides that a seller that did not manufacture a product is
not subject to a product liability action unless the seller had actual knowledge of
the defect, exercised substantial control over how it was made, altered the
product, removed labeling or instructions, or sold the product under its own
brand name, among other circumstances.3 A seller is also subject to a product
liability claim if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the
party bringing the action would be unable to enforce judgment against the
manufacturer.3 5
4. Eliminating Liability for "Open and Obvious" Hazards
and Preserving the No Duty to Trespassers Rule
The legislature also responded to a 2013 Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia decision that increased the liability exposure of anyone who owns
or leases a home, business, or other property. Departing from a century of law,
the court held that individuals and businesses can be held liable when a person
even when the condition that resulted in the injury
is injured on their property
36
was "open and obvious.,

Before this decision, West Virginia law provided that a land possessor
only has a duty to correct hidden dangers, not address every hole or rock that
37
might present a hazard. The court's decision in Hersh v. E-T Enterprises,
however, effectively required a full trial for every slip-and-fall claim to allocate
fault between the plaintiff and defendant. This result exposed West Virginians to
higher insurance rates and relieved visitors of personal responsibility.
To the relief of West Virginia homeowners and businesses, the
legislature restored the longstanding constraint on premises liability. The 2015
law provides that
[a] possessor of real property, including an owner, lessee or
other lawful occupant, owes no duty of care to protect others
against dangers that are open, obvious, reasonably apparent or
as well known to the person injured as they are to the owner or

33

See Dunn v. Kanawha Cty. Bd. of Educ., 459 S.E.2d 151, 157 (W. Va. 1995) ("[A]n

innocent seller can be subject to liability that is entirely derivative simply by virtue of being present
in the chain of distribution of the defective product.").
34
H.B. 2850, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-731 (b) (West 2018)).
35
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7- 31(b)(13) (West 2018).
36
See Hersh v. E-T Enters., Ltd. P'ship, 752 S.E.2d 336, 339 (W. Va. 2013).
37

See id.
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occupant, and shall not be held liable for civil38 damages for any
injuries sustained as a result of such dangers.
A separate law, also enacted in 2015, preemptively avoids further
expansions of premises liability by codifying and preserving the traditional
common law rule that a person who owns or leases property generally has no
duty to trespassers except to refrain from willfully or wantonly causing the
trespasser injury. 39 As recently as 1999, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals had reaffirmed this rule. 40 The legislation was adopted to avoid the
potential for West Virginia courts to adopt a radical approach endorsed by the
American Law Institute ("ALI") in its Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liabilityfor
Physical and Emotional Harm (2012).41 The ALI recommended that courts
impose a broad new duty on possessors to exercise reasonable care for all
entrants on their land, including unwanted trespassers. 42 The only exception to
this new duty is for harms to so-called "flagrant trespassers"43-a concept that
would lead to litigation because the term is undefined and appears in no state's
law. In enacting the 2015 law, West Virginia joined the majority of states that
have codified the general "no duty to trespassers" rule,4 4 while recognizing
narrow exceptions long recognized by state common law.45
38

S.B. 13, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-28
(West 2018)).
39
S.B. 3,2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-27 (West
2018)).
40
Mallet v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436, 446 (W. Va. 1999) (abandoning the common law
distinction between licensees and invitees while "retain[ing] our traditional rule with regard to a
trespasser, that being that a landowner or possessor need only refrain from willful or wanton
injury").
41

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 51

(AM. LAW INST. 2012).
42
Id.

43

Id. § 52 cmt. a.
44
See ALA. CODE § 6-5-345 (2018); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-557 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 18-60-108 (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-115(3)(a) (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.075(3)(b) (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-3 (West 2018); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-31-11-1
to -5 (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-821 (West 2018); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.232 (West
2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.583 (West 2018); MIss. CODE ANN. § 95-5-31 (West 2018);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.351 (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.515 (West 2018); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 38B-1 to -4 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-47-02 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.402 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 80 (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-82-10
(2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-9-11.1 to -11.6 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-208 (West
2018); TEx. CIV. PRAc. & REM. ANN. § 75.007 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-14-301 (West
2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-219.1 (West 2018); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.529 (West 2018); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34-19-201 to -204 (West 2018).
45
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-27(d) (West 2018) (expressing intent to "codify and preserve
the common law in West Virginia on the duties owed to trespassers by possessors of real property
as of the effective date of this section"); see also Mallet, 522 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Sutton v.
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Adopting the Wrongful Conduct Rule

An increasing number of states have recognized or adopted the wrongful
conduct rule,46 which provides that "[a] person cannot maintain an action if, in
order to establish his cause of action, he must rely, in whole or in part, on an
illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party. 4 7 More simply stated,
the wrongful conduct rule prohibits an individual from profiting legally from his
or her own criminal activity. Application of the wrongful conduct rule has often
arisen in prescription drug abuse litigation, and it is in this context that the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to recognize the rule as part of the
state's common law in 2015.
In Tug Valley Pharmacy, L.L.C. v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo
County,48 the Court allowed 29 individuals to maintain causes of action against
pharmacies and physicians for allegedly causing or contributing to the plaintiffs'
drug addictions, even where the plaintiffs had admitted to illegal conduct in their
acquisition and abuse of controlled substances from the defendants. 49 A majority
of the Court found that West Virginia's "system of comparative negligence offers
the most legally sound and well-reasoned approach to dealing with a plaintiff
Monongahela Power Co., 158 S.E.2d 98, 104 (W. Va. 1967)) (recognizing West Virginia's version
of the "attractive nuisance doctrine," which provides a duty to trespassing children when the owner
or possessor "knew, or should have known, of the dangerous condition and that children frequented
the dangerous premises either for pleasure or out of curiosity).
46
See generally Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (barring
failure-to-warn claim of addicted plaintiff brought against narcotic manufacturers); Oden v. Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, 621 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 1993) (barring claim of estate of minor killed
by vending machine that fell on him while he attempted to steal soft drinks); Lord v. Fogcutter
Bar, 813 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1991) (barring action by plaintiff against bar for plaintiffs subsequent
criminal activity); Greenwald v. Van Handel, 88 A.3d 467 (Conn. 2014) (barring claim by patient
against social worker for failure to treat patient's child pornography habit); Kaminer v. Eckerd
Corp. of Fla., 966 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (barring claim against pharmacy by estate
of student who overdosed on prescription drugs); Rimert v. Mortell, 680 N.E.2d 867 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (barring claim by convicted murderer's conservator against physician who released murderer
from mental hospital prior to murder); Pappas v. Clark, 494 N.W.2d 245 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)
(barring action by wife against physician and pharmacist for husband's drug addiction); Orzel v.
Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1995) (barring suit against pharmacy for alleged negligent
filling of controlled substance resulting in addiction); Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479
(Miss. 2006) (barring claim against doctors, pharmacies, and drug manufacturers for injuries
plaintiff sustained as result of drug addiction); Patten v. Raddatz, 895 P.2d 633 (Mont. 1995)
(barring negligence claims among parties who engaged in prostitution and drug abuse); Barker v.
Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984) (barring claim by minor injured while making pipe bomb
against retailer who sold firecrackers from which bomb was made); Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.,
497 S.E.2d 328 (Va. 1998) (barring claim by minor injured while operating stolen car); Feltner v.
Casey Family Program, 902 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 1995) (barring claim by foster family and biological
son against foster care placement program arising out of son's sexual abuse of foster child).
47
See Orzel, 537 N.W.2d at 212.
48

773 S.E.2d 627 (W. Va. 2015).

49

Id. at 628.
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who has engaged in immoral or illegal conduct," rather than the complete bar to
recovery which typically results from application of the wrongful conduct rule.5 °
As a result, the Court held that
a plaintiffs immoral or wrongful conduct does not serve as a
common law bar to his or her recovery for injuries or damages
incurred as a result of the tortious conduct of another. Unless
otherwiseprovidedat law, a plaintiff s conduct must be assessed
in accordance with our principles of comparative fault.5'
52
Criticism of the Tug Valley Pharmacy decision was strong and swift,
with state lawmakers reversing the decision through the codification of a
wrongful conduct rule the next legislative session.53 In doing so, the legislature
amended the comparative fault statute passed just one year prior, and discussed
herein, to clarify that an individual may not recover inany civil action if his or
her damages arise out of the commission or attempted commission of a felony
and are a proximate result of the crime committed or attempted to be
committed.5 4

B. Addressing LitigationAbuse
In addition to restoring balance to tort law principles, the legislature
addressed areas where West Virginia had become known for procedural
gamesmanship and unwarranted litigation. Recently enacted laws reduce the
ability of attorneys to forum shop for courts perceived as liability-friendly and
respond to excesses in asbestos, consumer, and workers' compensation litigation.

Id. at 635.
51 Id. at 636 (emphasis added).
52
In dissent, Justice Menis Ketchum bluntly wrote that "criminals should not be allowed to
use our judicial system to profit from their criminal activity.... The majority's ruling permitting
criminal plaintiffs to maintain these lawsuits ignores common sense and will encourage other
criminals to file similar lawsuits." Id.at 635.
53
S.B. 7, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016) (amending W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-13d(c)
(West 2018)). Other states have similarly codified a wrongful conduct rule. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 09.65.210 (West 2018); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.3 (West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 776.085 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.10 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.60
(West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.180 (West 2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 86.002(a) (West 2018).
54
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-13d(c)(1) (West 2018).
50
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1.

Stopping Litigation Tourism Through Venue Reform

For many years, West Virginia legislators tried to curb what has become
known as "litigation tourism. ' '55 In 2018, they may have succeeded.
There is a long history of plaintiffs' lawyers from around the nation
packing their bags and filing lawsuits in West Virginia on behalf of clients who
never lived or worked in the Mountain State. 56 As former Supreme Court of
Appeals Justice Richard Neely candidly explained 30 years ago:
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state
companies to in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not
only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else's money
away, but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs,
their families, and their friends will re-elect me.
[I]t should be obvious that the in-state local plaintiff, his
witnesses, and his friends, can all vote for the judge, while the
out-of-state defendant 57can't even be relied upon to send a
campaign contribution.
When court procedures, judges, juries, or the substantive law of liability
Virginia than
and damages are viewed as more favorable to plaintiffs in West 58
their home state, plaintiffs logically file lawsuits in West Virginia.
Past attempts to address this practice had limited success. In 2003, the
legislature responded by amending the state's venue statute. The law, which was
signed by Governor Bob Wise (D), barred nonresident plaintiffs from bringing
suit in West Virginia "unless all or a substantial part of the acts or omissions

55
See Tony Mauro, Anticipation Buildsfor Huge SCOTUS Ruling on Forum-Shopping,NAT'L
L.J. (June 14, 2017, 2:20 PM), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/06/14/anticipationbuilds-for-huge-scotus-ruling-on-forum-shopping/ (reporting tort scholar Victor Schwartz coined
the phrase "litigation tourism" to describe the problem of attorneys who file claims "in plaintifffriendly venues that have little or no connection to the defendant corporation or the injuries at
issue").
See Schwartz, Joyce & Silverman, supranote 1, at 769 (discussing the onslaught of asbestos
56
claims brought in West Virginia courts by nonresidents in the 1990s).
57

RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM

THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4, 62 (1988); see also Schwartz, Joyce & Silverman, supra note 1,

at 764-65 (further examining Neely's book).
58

Worsening the situation, in 2003, the Supreme Court of Appeals limited the ability of courts

to dismiss cases with little or no connection to the state, finding that the "doctrine offorum non
conveniens is a drastic remedy, which should be used with caution and restraint." Abbott v. OwensComing Fiberglass Corp., 444 S.E.2d 285, 292 (W. Va. 1994), supersededby statute, W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-1-1a (West 2018).
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giving rise to the claim occurred in this state., 59 The legislature also protected
nonresidents by allowing them to bring claims in West Virginia courts if they are
unable to obtain jurisdiction against the defendant in a state or federal court
60
where the action arose, unless barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
That law was short lived, as the Supreme Court of Appeals invalidated
it on eyebrow-raising grounds just three years after it took effect. That case,
Morris v. Crown Equipment Corp.,6 1 involved a worker who was injured in
Virginia while operating a forklift that had been sold and used in Virginia, and
where all witnesses and evidence presumably were in Virginia. 62 He sued the
company that designed and made the forklift, which was an Ohio corporation, in
the Kanawha Circuit Court.63 The plaintiff also named a West Virginia company
that distributed and serviced the forklift as a defendant, giving the lawsuit a local
tie.'
Applying the 2003 venue law, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit
65
because a substantial part of the acts at issue did not occur in West Virginia.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevents West Virginia from barring
lawsuits by a nonresident against a West Virginia defendant, even when the acts
occurred elsewhere. 66 In a fractured opinion, the court held that once venue is
proper as to the nonresident's claims against a West Virginia defendant, venue
67
is also proper for nonresident defendants.
This decision is in tension with longstanding U.S. Supreme Court
precedent that recognized "[t]here are manifest reasons for preferring residents
in access to often over-crowded Courts, both in convenience and in the fact that
68
broadly speaking it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned.
While many state venue laws make distinctions between residents and
nonresidents,69 this practice, the Supreme Court of Appeals found, was
impermissible as a matter of federal constitutional law in West Virginia. The
59 S.B. 213, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2003) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-1-1(c)
(West 2003)), invalidatedby Morris v. Crown Equip. Corp., 633 S.E.2d 292 (W. Va. 2006).
60

Id.

61

633 S.E.2d 292 (W. Va. 2006).

62

See id. at 294.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

See id.at 306.

See id.at 298-301.
See id. at 301. Two justices on the five-member court issued separate concurring opinions.
One justice dissented.
66

67

68
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 387 (1929) (upholding New York
statute providing that a foreign corporation or nonresident could only sue a foreign corporation in
New York if the defendant foreign corporation conducted business in New York).
69
See Schwartz, Joyce & Silverman, supra note 1, at 770 (citing state statutes).
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ruling also conflicted with the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens
that has, from its inception, considered the residency of the parties among other
factors in deciding whether a case should be heard elsewhere.7 ° The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari. 7'
As a result, lawyers were again able to bring product liability and other
lawsuits in West Virginia courts without any showing of acts or omissions in the
state, so long as each plaintiff alleged a colorable claim against one West
Virginia defendant. The legislature, hamstrung by the ruling, removed the
provision precluding claims by nonresidents when the claim had no substantial
connection to the state a decade ago and instead codified the state's existing
doctrine offorum non conveniens.72 While this factor-based approach can reduce
forum shopping when properly applied,73 it leaves significant discretion with trial
court judges whose historical reluctance to apply the doctrine to dismiss cases
with little or no connection to the state is the very reason venue reforms were
pursued in the first place.
The legislature again amended the venue statute in 2018.14 Like the 2003
law, the 2018 provision provides that "a nonresident of the state may not bring
an action in a court of this state unless all or a substantial part of the acts or
75
omissions giving rise to the claim asserted occurred in this state." It also
similarly provides an exception in situations where a nonresident's claim cannot
proceed where the action arose because of the plaintiff's inability to obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant there, unless the action is time-barred there.7 6 In
addition, the law provides that in cases in which there are multiple plaintiffs,
"each plaintiff must independently establish proper venue. ' , 77 This provision
prevents lawyers from circumventing the venue law by naming one West
Virginia resident as a plaintiff and joining scores of people who do not live in
West Virginia and whose claims have no connection to the state. The legislation,
which was signed into law by Governor Jim Justice (R), applies to all civil
actions filed on or after July 1, 2018.

70

See id. at 770-71 (citing longstanding U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence allowing courts to

favor the claims of residents over nonresidents).
71 Crown Equip. Corp. v. Morris, 594 U.S. 1096, 1096 (2006).
See H.B. 2956, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2007) (codified as amended at W. VA. CODE
72
ANN. § 56-1-1a (West 2018)).

73
See, e.g., State ex rel. J.C. v. Mazzone, 772 S.E.2d 336, 349-50 (W. Va. 2015) (upholding
dismissal of 20 nonresident Zoloft plaintiffs under theforum non conveniens statute's eight-factor
approach).
74
H.B. 4013, 2018 Leg., Comm. Subst., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018) (amending W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-1-1 (West 2018)).
75
Id. (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-1 -1 (c) (West 2018)).
76

Id.

77

Id.
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So what changed in the past 15 years to make a law once viewed as
unconstitutional by the highest court of West Virginia now constitutional? The
answer is the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated-three times since Morris v.
Crown Equipment Corp.-that not only are restrictions on nonresident claims
that have no connection to a state permissible, they are constitutionally
mandated.78 These decisions have tightened the requirements for courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. Read together, they instruct that
a court may not hear a claim against a business unless (1) the claim has a
substantial connection to the state, providing specific jurisdiction over the claim;
or (2) the company is incorporated or has a principle place of business in that
79
state, allowing general jurisdiction over that defendant.
First, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,S.A. v. Brown,8 o the Court
held that a North Carolina state court could not exercise jurisdiction over foreign
subsidiaries of a U.S. tire maker.81 That case involved a bus accident in France
and tires that were made and sold abroad, providing no basis for specific
jurisdiction. The subsidiaries had no place of business, employees, or bank
accounts in North Carolina; did not design, manufacture, or advertise their
products in North Carolina; did not solicit business in North Carolina or
themselves sell or ship tires to North Carolina customers. 82 Although a small
percentage of their tires were distributed through the "stream of commerce" in
North Carolina by others, the Court held this limited connection did not establish
the type of "continuous and systematic" contacts needed to empower the state
83
court to hear claims unrelated to the companies' contacts with North Carolina.
The next shoe to fall was Daimler AG v. Bauman,84 which basically
limited the forums in which a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction to
where that company is "essentially at home"-where it is incorporated or has its
principal place of business. 85 There, a German corporation was sued in federal
court in California by Argentinian plaintiffs for human rights violations allegedly
perpetrated by the company's Argentinian subsidiary in Argentina. 86 Building on
Goodyear, the U.S. Supreme Court reemphasized that "only a limited set of
affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose

78

See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017);

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

564 U.S. 915 (2011).
79

See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S.Ct. at 1779-8 1.

80

564 U.S. 915 (2011).

81

Id. at 918-19.
Id.at 921-22.

82

83
84
85

86

Id.
571 U.S. 117 (2014).
See id at 128, 137-38.
See id.at 122-23.
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jurisdiction[.]" 8 7 Subjecting the company to a lawsuit in California for conduct
"having nothing to do with anything" that occurred there, the Court held, would
exercise[] of all-purpose jurisdiction" and violate due
be an "exorbitant
88
process.
The Court's 2017 ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court
of California8 was the capstone that should put to rest debate regarding the
validity of West Virginia's venue law.90 Bristol-Myers Squibb held that state
courts may not decide cases that lack a specific connection to the state unless the
defendant is incorporated or has its principal place of business in that state. 9 1 In
an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed a California Supreme Court ruling that had
allowed its trial courts to hear a lawsuit brought by more than 600 individuals
from 33 different states seeking compensation for injuries associated with the
drug Plavix. 92 The state high court had reasoned that the manufacturer's
marketing and promotion of the drug throughout the United States, including in
California, established sufficient "minimum contacts" to allow the state court to
exercise jurisdiction over all of the claims, including those of nonresidents.9 3 The
U.S. Supreme Court found that "[w]hat is needed-and what is missing hereis a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue." 94 The Court
also recognized that "[t]he mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed,
obtained, and ingested [the product] in California-and allegedly sustained the
same injuries as did the nonresidents-does' 95not allow the State to assert specific
jurisdiction over the nonresidents' claims.
While these decisions were issued in the context of personal jurisdiction,
rather than venue, they indicate that it is perfectly appropriate (if not
constitutionally mandated) to consider whether a nonresident's claim has a
substantial connection to the state in which it is filed. West Virginia's 2018 venue
reform is consistent with these cases and should withstand legal scrutiny. As the
near unanimous decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb shows, it is now firmly
established that a state can and must curb the filing of lawsuits against

87
88

Id. at 137.
Id. at 139.

137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
Just a few months prior to the decision, legislation virtually identical to the 2003 venue law
was introduced, but not considered amidst speculation as to whether the legislation could withstand
legal scrutiny. See S.B. 451, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017). The Bristol-Myers Squibb
decision put that speculation to rest and cleared the path, so to speak, for passage of the venue
statute in 2018.
91
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
See id. at 1777.
92
89

90

93

See id at 1778-79.

94

Id. at 1781.
Id.

95
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nonresidents that lack a substantial connection to the state and that each plaintiff
must establish this connection.
2. Providing Medical Criteria for Asbestos Claims
and Transparency Between the Tort and Trust Systems
Beginning in the mid-1990s, courts, including those in West Virginia,
became "deluged with asbestos lawsuits.

'96

Lawyers sponsored X-ray screenings

to amass large numbers of claims, including many by individuals who had no
impairment. 97 One of the nation's most prolific "B-readers"-a radiologist that
reviews x-rays for signs of asbestosis-was West Virginia doctor Ray A.
Harron. 98 He reviewed "as many as 150 X-rays a day, or one every few minutes,
and produced medical reports for $125 each," according to a New York Times
exposd. 99 In 2012, a federal jury found two lawyers and Dr. Harron liable for
violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act (RICO) by
fraudulently filing asbestos claims. 00 Similar troubling practices occurred in
litigation alleging workers had developed silicosis, as 10,000 such lawsuits
suddenly flooded courts in the early 2000s.10 1 A federal judge found, "[T]hese
diagnoses were driven by neither health nor justice: they were manufactured for
money."'10 2 The filing of cases on behalf of unimpaired claimants not only

96

State ex rel. Allman v. MacQueen, 551 S.E.2d 369, 371-72, 374 (W. Va. 2001) (quoting

The Fairnessin Asbestos CompensationAct: Hearing on H.R. 1283 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary,106th Cong. 185-215 (July 1, 1999) (statement of William N. Eskridge, Professor, Yale

Law School)).
97
See Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The
DisconnectBetween Scholarship andReality?, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 33, 68 (2003).
98
See Jonathan D. Glater, Reading X-Rays in Asbestos Suits Enriched Doctor,N.Y. TIMES

(Nov. 29, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/29/business/reading-xrays-in-asbestos-suitsenriched-doctor.html.
99
See id.; see also In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 583, 596-97 (S.D.
Tex. 2005) (discussing Dr. Harron's unreliable practices); Mark A. Behrens, Asbestos Litigation
Screening Challenges:An Update, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 721, 722-24 (2009) (discussing mass
screening practice generally).
100
See Amaris Elliott-Engel, Two PittsburghAsbestos Lawyers Liable in FraudCases, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 31, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/legal/2012/12/
31FTwo-Pittsburgh-asbestos-lawyers-liable-in-fraud-cases/stories/201212310181; Daniel Fisher,
Law Firm Hit With $429,000 Verdict Over FakedAsbestos Suits, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2012, 12:19
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/12/21/law-firm-hit-with-429000-verdictover-faked-asbestos-suits. The lawyers ultimately agreed to pay the full $7.3 million in damages
and attorneys' fees and withdrew their appeal. See Emily Field, CSX, Asbestos Attys End 4th Circ.
RICO Fight With $7.3M Deal, LAw360 (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.law360.com/
articles/594159/csx-asbestos-attys-end-4th-circ-rico-fight-with-7-3m-deal.
101 See Susan Warren, Silicosis Suits Rise Like Dust, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2003, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SBI 06262836985280100.
102
In re Silica Prods.Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
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unjustly imposes potentially bankrupting liability on businesses, it also depletes
03
resources for people who are sick or who may develop illnesses in the future. 1
The West Virginia legislature responded by adopting medical criteria
based on guidelines developed by the American Medical Association for
determining impairment in cases alleging injuries stemming from exposure to
asbestos or silica. The 2015 law, known as the Asbestos and Silica Claims
Priorities Act, prioritizes judicial consideration of claims of individuals who can
demonstrate actual physical impairment, requires medical documentation to
support a claim, and preserves the rights of individuals who have been exposed
but who have no present physical impairment, to bring an
to asbestos or to silica,
04
action in the future.
This approach finds support in Shared State Legislation adopted by the
Council of State Governments; 0 5 in resolutions adopted by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners and the National Conference of
Insurance Legislators supporting the enactment of objective medical criteria to
fairly treat asbestos claimants who have not yet manifested symptoms; 06 and in
an American Bar Association resolution supporting the enactment of federal.
asbestos medical criteria legislation to advance only those cases of individuals
with demonstrated physical impairment. 07 Similar laws are in place in nine other
that host significant asbestos litigation have
states. 108 Courts in other jurisdictions
09
adopted comparable procedures.1
103

See Mark A. Behrens, What's New in Asbestos Litigation?,28 REV. LITIG. 501, 505 (2009).

104

S.B. 411, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-7F-1

to -11 (West 2018)).
105

COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS,

2006

SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION: ASBESTOS TORT REFORM

(2006), https://www.csg.org/sslfiles/dockets/26cycle/2006vol/2006ssldrafts/asbestostortreform2
06ssl.pdf (sharing Ohio law).
106

See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF INS. LEGISLATORS, RESOLUTION REGARDING THE NEED FOR

EFFECTIVE ASBESTOS REFORM (2003), http://ncoil.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/AsbestosResol
ution.doc; Alliance PraisesNAIC Adoption of Strong Asbestos Resolution, INS. J. (May 15, 2003),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/nationalU2003/05/15/28978.htm.
107

ABA COMM'N ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Feb. 2003),

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/full report.authcheckdam.pdf
(adopting the ABA Standard for Non-Malignant Asbestos-Related Disease Claims).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 774.204 (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-1 (West 2018); IOWA
108
CODE § 686B.1 (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4901 (West 2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.91 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§ 90-94 (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44135-10 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-209 (West 2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
90.001-90.003 (West 2018).
Examples of such jurisdictions include Boston, New York City, Chicago, and Baltimore
109
City. See In re Asbestos Cases (Cook County Cir. Ct., Ill. Mar. 26, 1991; In re Mass. State Ct.
Asbestos Pers. Injury Litig. (Middlesex Super. Ct., Mass. amended Sept. 22, 1994); In re Asbestos
Pers. Injury & Wrongful Death Asbestos Cases, No. 92344501, 1992 WL 12019620 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 9, 1992); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., No. 40000/88, 2002 WL 32151568 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 19, 2002).
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The same legislation addressed another form of widespread abuse in
asbestos litigation. In litigation, plaintiffs' attorneys allege that their clients'
injuries stem from exposure to asbestos from products of solvent companies.
Plaintiffs' attorneys also file claims on behalf of the same individuals with trusts
established by companies that are bankrupt as a result of asbestos-related
liability. These trust claims sometimes contradict deposition testimony in the
civil suit by asserting the plaintiffs exposure stemmed from sources other than
those disclosed in the litigation."10 A federal judge has found that the tort system
is "infected by the manipulation of exposure evidence by plaintiffs and their
lawyers," which has the "effect of unfairly inflating the recoveries."'"
In response, West Virginia adopted a law that provides transparency
between asbestos litigation and claims for compensation filed with asbestos
trusts. 112 The new law requires a plaintiff to provide a sworn statement

identifying all trust claims that the plaintiff has filed or potentially could be filed
no later than 120 days before trial."13 A plaintiff must also make available to all
parties all trust claims materials." 4 If a plaintiff has not made these disclosures,
a court may not schedule the case for trial.' 1 5 The court may also stay asbestos
litigation if the plaintiff has a potential asbestos trust claim until it is filed." 6 In
addition, the law addresses the practice of "double dipping," in which a plaintiff
is compensated twice for the same injury through a lawsuit and trust claims, by
entitling defendants to a setoff or credit in the amount of the valuation established
by the trust.' West Virginia is among a dozen states that have enacted trust

110
CASE

See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, DISCONNECTS AND DOUBLE-DPPING: THE
FOR

ASBESTOS

BANKRUPTCY

TRUST

TRANSPARENCY

IN VIRGINIA

8-10

(2016),

https://instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/l/DisconnectsDoubleDipPaperWebReady.pdf
(documenting several examples).
I
In re Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC, 504 B.R. 71, 82, 86 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
112
S.B. 411, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-7F-1
to -11 (West 2018)).
"13
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7F-4(a) (West 2018).
114
Id. § 55-7F-4(b).
115
Id. § 55-7F-4(d), -6(a).
116
Id. § 55-7F-6(b).
117

Id. § 55-7F-9.
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such
transparency laws," 8 in addition to individual courts that have addressed
9
orders."
management
case
and
rulings
practices through discovery
3.

Addressing Excessive Litigation Under the
West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act

The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA)
prohibits a debt collector from using "unfair or unconscionable means to collect
or attempt to collect any claim." 20 In recent years, this provision spurred "gotcha
lawsuits" in which some claims attempted to turn a business's reasonable attempt
to collect an outstanding bill for $25 into a $75,000 claim.' 2' These types of
lawsuits allege that a collection attempt violates a technical requirement of the
law and seeks steep statutory fines for every bill mailed or follow up call or letter.
Twice since 2015, the legislature amended the WVCCPA to reduce the
potential for abuse. First, the legislature clarified that certain practices are
permissible under the law, such as sending consumers regular account statements
and notices, and cannot constitute a prohibited communication seeking payment
of a debt.' 22 That legislation also provided that plaintiffs cannot recover more
than $1,000 per violation. 23 The legislature revisited the WVCCPA in 2017 to
require that, before filing a lawsuit, consumers give 45 days' notice to a creditor
or debt collector, providing the business with an opportunity to correct the
situation. 124 If the consumer accepts the offer, then the business must address the

118

See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-782 (2018); IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 686A. 1 (West 2018); N.D.

CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-46.1-01 (West 2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.951 (West 2018);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, §§ 81-89 (West 2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-67-1 (West 2018); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-66 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-601 (West 2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 90.051 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 78B-6-2001 (West 2018); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 802.025 (West 2018).
119
See William P. Shelley et. al, The Needfor FurtherTransparencyBetween the Tort System
and Section 524(g) Asbestos Trusts, 2014 Update-Judicialand Legislative Developments and
Other Changes in the Landscape Since 2008, 23 WIDENER L.J. 675, 702-09 (2014).
120
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-128 (West 2018).
121

See, e.g., Susan Baek, FrivolousLawsuit Alert, 111 W. VA. MED. J. 41-42 (May/June 2015)

(describing one such suit brought against a physician), http://cdn.coverstand.com/30875/254650/
1032a7 ld895a1565ad6087d19a8047a7e2afdd6d. 15.pdf.
122
S.B. 542, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2128(e) (West 2018)).
123
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5- 101 (West 2018). Prior law allowed statutory damages between
$100 and $1,000 subject to the discretion of the trial judge. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5- 101(1)
(West 2015). This amount was subject to an inflation adjustment, however, allowing for damages
as high as $4,800 per violation. See Lanham v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 169 F. Supp. 3d 658, 661
n.2 (S.D. W. Va. 2016).
124 S.B. 563, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5108(a) (West 2018)).
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issue within 20 days and litigation is avoided. 125 If no offer is made, then the
consumer may file a claim. 126 If an offer is made during that 45-day period but
is rejected by the consumer, that consumer can recover
attorney's fees if he or
1 27
she prevails at trial and is awarded more than the offer.
The legislature also amended WVCCPA provisions that generally
prohibit unfair and deceptive business practices.128 The 2015 law responds to a
Supreme Court of Appeals ruling that effectively eliminated a requirement that
' 1
those who bring consumer protection claims show an "ascertainable loss. 29
Instead, the court allowed claims to merely assert that consumers purchased a
product or service that was "different" or "inferior" from what they expected
without the need to show any actual damages. 30 The statute now explicitly
provides that when a consumer files a WVCCPA claim seeking damages, he or
she must show an "actual out-of-pocket loss" caused by the alleged violation.' 3
That modest change may help 132
West Virginia avoid becoming a magnet for noinjury consumer class actions.
4.

Preserving the Workers' Compensation Act

The workers' compensation system benefits Workers by providing quick,
no-fault compensation for work-related injuries, is supported by employers
because it limits their liability exposure, and helps both parties by avoiding costly
and time-consuming litigation. There is a history, however, of the Supreme Court
of Appeals interpreting the Workers' 33Compensation Act to allow employees to
bring tort claims against employers.'
Since its 1913 adoption, West Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act
has allowed workers to bring a claim against their employers for a work-related
injury outside the no-fault system if he or she can show an employer acted with
"deliberate intention ...to produce the injury or death., 134 As this language
suggests, it was meant as a narrow exception. 35 The court began diluting the
125
126

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-108(d) (West 2018).
Id. § 46A-5-108(a).

Id. § 46A-5-108(f).
S.B. 315, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (amending W. VA. CODE ANN.
106(b) (West 2018)).
129
See In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 76 (W. Va. 2003).
127

128

§ 46A-6-

130

Id.

131

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-106(b) (West 2018).

132

See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Rise of "Empty Suit" Litigation:

Where Should Tort Law Draw the Line?, 80 BROOK. L. REv. 599, 628-73 (2015).
133
See Schwartz, Joyce, & Silverman, supra note 1, at 782-85.
134
135

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(c) (West 2018).
See Jami Suver, A BriefHistory of DeliberateIntent Actions in West Virginia, 21 No. 2 W.

VA. EMP. L. LETrER 5 (Aug. 2015).
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deliberate intent standard in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.,' 36 when it
found that while the workers' compensation act removed injuries resulting from
negligence from the tort system, lawsuits alleging an employer acted recklessly
fell within this exception.137 The legislature then responded by providing a more
38
specific standard in 1986, only for the court to dilute it again in 1990 and 2006,1
and, most recently, in 2013.139
In the latest case, McComas v. ACF Industries, the court ruled that an
employer is subject to liability for worker injuries outside the workers'
compensation system even when it had no actual knowledge of a workplace
hazard if a plaintiff alleges that the employer would have learned of the hazard
had it routinely conducted industry-required safety inspections. 140 As Justice
Loughry recognized in his dissent, this ruling was "yet another step toward...
rendering our 'deliberate intent' statute a meaningless codification of simple
workplace negligence standards.' 14 ' The majority created a tort action based on
what an employer should have discovered through an inspection, rather than
of a specific dangerous condition, as the statute had
actual knowledge
42
required. 1

The legislature responded in 2015 by overturning McComas. 143 Among
other workers' compensation reforms, the new law defines "deliberate intent" as
encompassing situations in which an employer "consciously, subjectively and
deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or death to
an employee."'' 44 The legislature also allowed claims outside the workers'
compensation system when there is evidence that an employer had actual
knowledge of a specific unsafe working condition that presented a high degree
of risk and a strong probability of serious injury or death, but failed to address
it. 145 In addition, under the new law, a plaintiff can show an employer had "actual
knowledge" through evidence, such as an intentional failure to conduct a
mandated safety inspection or knowledge of "prior accidents, near misses, safety
136
137

246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
See id. at 914.

138
See Ryan v. Clonch Indus. Inc., 639 S.E.2d 756, 763 (W. Va. 2006) (finding failure to
conduct a safety inspection that would have revealed a need for personal protective equipment
permitted a tort claim); Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc., 405 S.E.2d 15, 23 (W. Va. 1990) (finding the
legislature's 1986 amendment "in an apparent effort to narrow the parameters of civil liability for
employers, has indeed broadened the concept").
139
McComas v. ACF Indus., LLC, 750 S.E.2d 235 (W. Va. 2013).
See id. at 243.
140
Id. at 245 (Loughry, J., dissenting, joined by Benjamin, CJ.).
141
See id.
142
H.B. 2011, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2
143

(West 2018)).
144
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(A) (West 2018).
145
See id. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

23

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 121

complaints or citations from regulatory agencies."' 46 The new law explicitly
prohibits claims outside the workers' compensation system based on what an
14 7
employer allegedly "should have known.'
C. More Reasonably DeterminingDamages
In addition to adopting mainstream tort law principles and reining in
litigation abuse, the West Virginia legislature enacted four proposals that address
inflated or excessive damage awards. These changes should reduce the potential
for "jackpot justice," make the state's liability system more predictable, and
facilitate settlement of disputes.
1. Advancing Proportionality in Punishment
A new West Virginia law more closely ties punishment imposed through
a punitive damage award to the actual harm caused by a defendant's misconduct.
Before 2015, unlike most other states, West Virginia did not require "clear and
48
convincing" evidence of misconduct to support a punitive damage award.
Instead, courts applied the lower preponderance of the evidence standard used
for ordinary civil liability. 149 West Virginia also allowed limitless punitive
damage awards, subject only to review for excessiveness under constitutional
principles of due process. This combination had resulted in multimillion dollar
50
verdicts in cases involving ordinary negligence, not malicious wrongdoing.
Legislation enacted in 2015 fundamentally changes the way punitive
damages are decided in West Virginia.' 51 It requires clear and convincing
evidence of "actual malice toward the plaintiff or a conscious, reckless and
outrageous indifference to the health, safety and welfare of others" to support

146

Id. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(I), (I11).

147

Id. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(II).
See Coleman v. Sopher, 499 S.E.2d 592, 606 n.21 (W. Va. 1997). By 2000, 29 states and

148

the District of Columbia had adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard for punitive
damage awards. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild":
Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 1003, 1013 (1999)
[hereinafter Reining in PunitiveDamages] (citing statutes and court decisions). Additional states
have followed. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-207 (West 2018) (enacted 2003); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(1) (West 2018) (enacted 2011).
149
Goodwin v. Thomas, 403 S.E.2d 13, 16 (W. Va. 1991).
150 See, e.g., Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, 763 S.E.2d 73, 94 (W. Va. 2014) (Benjamin, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reducing $80 million punitive damages award against
nursing home to $32 million, an amount seven times the amount of compensatory damages, in a
case in which the jury found no more than simple negligence).
151
S.B. 421, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-29
(West 2018)).
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such an award.1 2 This standard reflects the quasi-criminal nature of punitive
damages and falls between the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof
used to establish liability in an ordinary civil case and the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard applied in criminal cases. 153
In addition, the new law allows a defendant to request that the jury
determine liability for compensatory damages before considering punitive
damages. 51 4 Bifurcation of the trial in this manner reduces the risk that plaintiffs'
attorneys will inflame the jury by tarnishing the reputation of a defendant or
emphasizing its financial resources before deciding whether a defendant is
responsible for a plaintiff s injury.
Finally, the new law provides proportionality between the harm resulting
from misconduct and the punishment. Punitive damages can be as high as four
times the amount of compensatory damages or $500,000, whichever is greater. 5 5
This law places West Virginia in the mainstream, as most states have adopted
similar safeguards.' 5 6 It is also consistent with historic precedent for punishing
misconduct and the U.S. Supreme Court's cautionary instruction that punitive
of compensatory damages are
damage awards that are four times the amount
"close to the line" of a due process violation.15 7
Courts nationwide have overwhelmingly found that statutory limits on
punitive damages are constitutional, as setting appropriate levels of punishment
§ 55-7-29(a) (West 2018).

152

W. VA. CODE ANN.

153

154

See Reining in Punitive Damages, supra note 148, at 1013.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-29(b) (West 2018).

155

Id. § 55-7-29(c).

About half of the states that permit punitive damages have enacted statutory limits. See, e.g., •
§ 6-11-21 (2018); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 9.17.020(f)-(h) (West 2018); COLO. REV.
§ 13-21-102(1)(a) (West 2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 2018)
(product liability only); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(f)(g) (West 2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604 (West 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (West
2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702 (West 2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 2-804(b) (2018)
(repeal effective 2019) (wrongful death cases only); MISS. CODEANN. § 11-1-65 (West 2018); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 510.265 (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 15-5.14 (West 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § I D-25 (West 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32.03.2-11
(2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West
2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-530 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104 (West 2018); TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (West 2018);
WIS. STAT. ANN § 895.043(6) (West 2018). In addition, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington generally do not authorize punitive damage awards.
See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 495 (2008).
157
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) (observing that imposing double,
triple, or quadruple damages for wrongs has historic precedent dating back 700 years to English
statutes); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)
(indicating "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process" and that "[w]hen compensatory damages
are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the
outermost limit of the due process guarantee").
156

ALA. CODE
STAT. ANN.
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is firmly a legislative policy judgment. 58 Plaintiffs have no "right" to punitive
damages, which do not serve a compensatory purpose. In 2017, the Supreme
Court of Appeals ruled because "[a] plaintiff has no right, much less a vested
right, to an award of punitive damages prior to trial" the punitive damage limit
applies to pending claims.1 59 That finding, along with West Virginia's
longstanding precedent upholding limits on noneconomic damages,' 60 strongly
supports the legislature's constitutional authority to place reasonable constraints
on punitive damage awards.
2.

Curbing "Phantom Damages"

Anyone who has read a medical bill knows that the "list prices" initially
indicated as the cost of medical treatment are not the amounts paid by a patient
or insurer. Standard rates for the same medical service can vary drastically
among healthcare providers.' 6' Healthcare providers routinely accept payment
that is substantially lower than the billed amount based on negotiated rates with
managed care plans or payment schedules set by Medicare rules.' 62 Likewise,
uninsured patients rarely pay list prices, as healthcare providers have established
indigent care programs that provide subsidies or discounts to low-income
patients and write off an increasing amount of bills.1 63 In a 2014 decision,
158
Nearly every federal and state court considering the constitutionality of statutory punitive
damage limits in conjunction with the right to trial by jury has found that placing bounds on such
punishment is constitutional. See, e.g., Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1051 (Alaska
2002); Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 994 (Kan. 1993); Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1,
12-14 (N.C. 2004); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 476 (Ohio 2007); Seminole
Pipeline Co. v. Broad Leaf Partners, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 730, 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); Pulliam v.
Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999). Courts have also
recognized that statutory limits do not violate the separation of powers. See, e.g., Evans, 56 P.3d
at 1055-56; Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 490; Pulliam,509 S.E.2d at 319. Outliers include Arkansas and
Missouri. See Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer, 385 S.W.3d 822 (Ark. 2011) (invalidating
punitive damage limit pursuant to a unique provision of the Arkansas Constitution barring limits
on recovery outside the employment context); Lewellen v. Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. 2014)
(invalidating punitive damage limit based on interpretation of the Missouri Constitution's right to
a jury trial).
159
Martinez v. Asplundh Tree Experts, 803 S.E.2d 582, 589 (W. Va. 2017).
160
See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
161
See Wilson Andrews et al., Disparity in Medical Billing, WASH. POST (May 8, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/nationa/actual-cost-of-medical-care
(reporting
that "even on the same street, hospitals can vary by upwards of 300% in price for the same
service").
162
See Fee Schedule-General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/feeschedulegeninfo/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
163
Researchers found that, in 2001, patients at California hospitals with private insurance paid
41% of charges, patients with Medicare and Medicaid paid 35% and 30% of billed rates,
respectively, and uninsured patients paid 39% of billed charges. Glenn A. Melnick & Katya
Fonkych, HospitalPricingand the Uninsured:Do the UninsuredPay HigherPrices?,27 HEALTH
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however, the Supreme Court of Appeals put these practical considerations aside
and prevented juries from learning that the amounts plaintiffs' lawyers seek as
compensation for their client's medical expenses are wildly inflated.
In Kenney v. Liston,164 the court held that jurors may only consider
evidence of the amount initially billed for a plaintiff's medical care, even if the
amount that the healthcare provider accepted as full payment for that treatment
was substantially less.' 65 There, the plaintiff sued a drunk driver for injuries
resulting from an accident. The plaintiff introduced, and the jury awarded, the
full amount of his bills for past medical expenses, $74,061, even though a portion
of those invoiced amounts were discounted or written off by healthcare providers
and not paid by the plaintiff or his health insurer.' 66 The Court regarded the
amount of the medical bills as indicative of the reasonable value of medical
services and interpreted the collateral source rule as prohibiting introduction of
67
evidence of the amounts actually paid in full satisfaction of those medical bills.'
This approach contrasts with states such as California, Oklahoma, North
Carolina, and Texas, which do not allow plaintiffs to recover "phantom
168
damages"-amounts that exist only on paper that no one ever paid or will pay.
In 2015, the legislature overturned Kenney with respect to medical
professional liability claims. The new law limits a verdict for past medical
expenses to "the total amount... paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff' and any
incurred unpaid amounts that "the plaintiff or another person on behalf of the
plaintiff is obligated to pay."' 6 9 This law ensures that plaintiffs receive
compensation for their actual medical expenses (even if paid by an insurer) while
reducing the potential that West Virginia courts will award damages that reflect
healthcare billing practices, not real costs.
Since the provision eliminating "phantom damages" was included in a
comprehensive medical liability reform bill and codified within West Virginia's
Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA), the applicability of the reforms may
not extend beyond that context. An argument can be made, however, that the

AFF. 116, 118 (2008). The study found that, over time, the ratios declined for all payers in part due
to the rapid increase in billed charges. See id. In 2005, uninsured patients as a group continued to
pay less than those with private insurance, but a higher percentage of charges, on average, than
patients with Medicare or Medicaid coverage. See id. at 119.
164 760 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 2014).
165 See id.at 445-46.

166

See id.

167

See id.at 446.

168 See OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 12, § 3009.1 (West 2018) (enacted 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
8C-1, 414 (West 2018) (enacted 2011); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.0105 (West 2018)
(enacted 2003); Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Cal. 2011);
see also Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011) (interpreting Texas statute).
169 S.B. 6, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-9d
(West 2018)).
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provision extends to all claims and, if it does not, it should. 170 Observers,
including West Virginia trial court judges, recognize the 2015 reform was
adopted in "direct response" to the Kenney decision.1 7 1 Kenney was a motor
vehicle accident case, not a medical malpractice lawsuit. While the new law
advances the medical liability concerns that the bill addresses by eliminating
phantom damages in such suits, the provision responded to a broader concern
and should72be applied in any personal injury action seeking recovery of medical

expenses. 1
3.

Restoring a Duty to Mitigate Damages in Employment Litigation

Until recently, damage awards in West Virginia employment cases
exceeded amounts awarded under federal law and the law of surrounding states.
This situation resulted from a series of court decisions, beginning with Mason
County Boardof Educationv. State SuperintendentofSchools1 73 in 1982, finding
that plaintiffs pursuing employment-related lawsuits have no duty to mitigate

In stark contrast to virtually every other section of the MPLA, which govern elements of
proof, the admissibility of expert testimony, several liability, limits on noneconomic damages, and
other matters, there is nothing in the text of the statute eliminating "phantom damages" that
explicitly limits its application to medical liability actions. Cf W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-7B-3(a)
("The following are necessary elements of proof that an injury or death resulted from the failure of
a health care provider to follow the accepted standard of care .... ), 55-7B-4(a) ("A cause of
action for injury to a person alleging medical professional liability against a health care
provider.., arises as of the date of injury ..
), 55-7B-5(a) ("In any medical professional liability
action against a health care provider ..
), 55-7B-6(a) ("[N]o person may file a medical
professional liability action against any health care provider .. "), 55-7B-6A(a) ("Within thirty
days of the filing of an answer by a defendant in a medical professional liability action .. "), 557B-6B(a) ("In each professional liability action filed against a health care provider, the court shall
....
55-7B-7(a)
.),
("The applicable standard of care and a defendant's failure to meet the standard
of care, if at issue, shall be established in medical professional liability cases by the plaintiff by
testimony of one or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses .. "), 55-7B-8(a) ("In any
professional liability action brought against a health care provider .. "), 55-7B-9(a) ("In the trial
of a medical professional liability action under this article involving multiple defendants .... "),
55-7B-9B ("An action may not be maintained against a health care provider pursuant to this article
by or on behalf of a third-party nonpatient for rendering or failing to render health care services to
a patient .... "), 55-7B-9C(a) ("In any action brought under this article for injury to or death of a
patient as a result of health care services or assistance rendered in good faith and necessitated by
an emergency condition .. ") (West 2018).
171
The Hon. Judge Joseph K. Reeder & Matthew G. Chapman, 2015 West VirginiaLegislation
Update: Part I, 118 W. VA. L. REv. ONLiNE 23 (2015), https://wvlawreview.wvu.edu/westvirginia-law-review-online/2015/09/29/2015-west-virginia-legislation-update-part-i.
172
In fact, legislation introduced in 2016 would have explicitly overruled Kenney and applied
to any action to recover damages for health care services or treatment resulting from injury or
death. See S.B. 296, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016).
173
295 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1982).
170
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their damages by seeking new employment between the time of discharge and
174
trial if the former employer acted with "malice" in terminating the individual.
The practical result of these decisions was that even when a plaintiff
found comparable employment after termination, that person could seek
damages for front pay for the remainder of his or her working life. This approach
could lead to millions of dollars in damages for the loss of a career's worth of
lost income, 75 even when a plaintiff quickly secures a new job. It also gave
plaintiffs license to not earnestly seek employment. 176 In addition, juries could
award punitive damages on top of front and back pay awards that already
employers that were found to
exceeded actual damages, 77 double-punishing
78
employees.
terminated
have wrongfully
The legislature brought West Virginia employment law into the
mainstream in 2015 by enacting legislation that compensates those who are
subjected to an unlawful employment action, while ensuring that the award does
not far exceed the goal of making a wronged employee whole. 179 The new law
abolishes the "malice" exception and recognizes that all plaintiffs have an
affirmative duty to mitigate past and future lost wages. '80 It also affirms the trial
judge's responsibility to determine whether reinstatement or front pay is a
plaintiff's appropriate remedy, and tasks the trial court judge with determining
the amount of front pay, if any, to be awarded.' 8 ' In 2017, the Supreme Court of
Appeals itself recognized that West Virginia had "adopted a concept of
unmitigated front and back pay unrecognized by any other state," found that the

174

Mason Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Sch., 295 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1982);

see also Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Rice, 736 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 2012); W. Va. Am. Water
Co. v. Nagy, No. 101229, 2011 WL 8583425 (W. Va. June 15, 2011) (memorandum decision);

Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 680 S.E.2d 791, 815 (W. Va. 2009).
175
See, e.g., Rice, 736 S.E.2d at 343 (affirming jury award of unmitigated front pay totaling
$1,991,332, in addition to $142,659 in back pay, but found punitive damages unwarranted on claim
brought by employee who alleged age discrimination when his position was eliminated following
company acquisition).
176
See Amber Marie Moore, Note, Can Damages Be Too Damaging? Examining Mason
County and Its Progeny, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 807, 822-23 (2012).
177
See, e.g., Nagy, 2011 WL 8583425, at *2 (affirming award that included $200,450 in back
pay; $900,000 in front pay; $150,000 for humiliation, embarrassment, or loss of personal dignity;
$150,000 for emotional distress; and $350,000 in punitive damages).
178
See Rice, 736 S.E.2d at 349-51 (Benjamin, J., dissenting) (finding "damages awarded in
excess of that which compensates a plaintiff for actual loss based upon a finding that the defendant
engaged in malicious conduct toward the plaintiff are, by their very nature, punitive" and should
be subject to constitutional review as such).
179
S.B. 344, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-7E-1
(West 2018)).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7E-3(a) (West 2018).
180
181
Id. § 55-7E-3(b).
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legislature had abrogated
Mason County and its progeny, and applied the new
82
law to pending claims.'
4.

Adopting a More Reasonable Judgment Interest Rate

The purpose of judgment interest is to "compensate the successful
plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for the loss from the time between
the ascertainment of the damage and the payment by the defendant." '8 3 Until
2017, however, West Virginia imposed an interest rate on judgments that
significantly exceeded inflation. Under that law, which had not been altered in
ten years, courts awarded compound interest at a rate of three points above the
Fifth Federal Reserve discount rate. 8 4 That law also provided that the judgment
interest rate could not be less than 7% or exceed 11% per year.' 85 That year, the
Administrative Office of the Supreme Court of Appeals set the interest rate at
the minimum 7% level. 1 86 Meanwhile, the Fifth Federal Reserve District's
discount rate was 1.75%,187 and a plaintiff would have received less than 1%
interest if the money owed had been in a money market account. Rather than
serving a compensatory purpose, the interest rate on judgments punished those
who defended themselves in court.
The legislature adjusted interest rates on court judgments in 2017 to
more closely reflect market rates.' 88 The new law sets the judgment interest rate
at two points above the discount rate and uses simple, rather than compound,
interest. 89 In addition, the new law reduces the minimum interest rate from 7%

182

See Martinez v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 803 S.E.2d 582, 587 (W. Va. 2017). Notably,

Justice Loughry acknowledged that

[t]he Legislature ...commendably sought to eradicate West Virginia's outlier
status regarding unmitigated back and front pay in employment claims and
thereby eliminate an unjustifiable windfall to plaintiffs. The duty of an injured
plaintiff to mitigate damages is a long-standing and universally recognized
principle that [Mason County] obliterated, thereby creating a blight on our state's
wrongful discharge laws.

See id.at 590 (Loughry, J., concurring).
183 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (quoting Poleto
v. Consol. Rail Corp., 826 F.2d 1270, 1280 (3d Cir. 1987)).
194 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-6-31 (West 2018).
185

Id.

186

See

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF W. VA., ADMIN. ORDER RE: DETERMINATION AND

DISSEMINATION OF THE RATE OF INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS AND DECREASE FOR THE YEAR 2017

(2017), http://www.courtswv.gov/legal-community/pdfs/interest2017.pdf.
187
See id.
188

H.B. 2678, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017) (amending W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-6-31

(West 2018)).
189

Id.
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to 4% and the maximum rate from 11% to 9%.' 90 The change led to a decrease
in the judgment interest rate from 7% to 4.5% in 2018.' 9'
D. Additional Progress
The West Virginia Legislature adopted four additional civil justice
reforms that have contributed to improving the state's legal climate. The first
updates and modernizes the state's arbitration laws, providing an efficient and
cost-effective way of resolving disputes without litigation. That law adopts a
process that closely tracks federal law and is consistent with states that follow
uniform arbitration rules. 192 The second discourages forum shopping specific to
product liability claims by clarifying that when a nonresident files a lawsuit,
West Virginia courts apply the law of the state where the injury occurred.' 93 The
third modified the state's Wage Payment and Collection Act to allow employers
more flexibility with respect to the required timing of payment of wages to
employees and separated employees, thereby reducing technical and punitive
violations under the Act which often resulted from West Virginia's unique
payment requirements. 194
The fourth overhauls West Virginia's MPLA. In response to Supreme
Court of Appeals decisions that had limited the MPLA's application,' 95 and the

190
191

Id.
See

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF W. VA., ADMIN. ORDER RE: DETERMINATION AND

DISSEMINATION OF THE RATE OF INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS AND DECREASE FOR THE YEAR

2018

(2018), http://www.courtswv.gov/legal-community/pdfs/interest2018.pdf.
192 S.B. 37, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015).
193 H.B. 2726, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-8-16
(West 2018)). This legislation expanded the scope of a law enacted in 2011 applicable only to
failure to warn claims brought against pharmaceutical manufacturers, which was particularly
necessary given the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's rejection of the learned
intermediary doctrine. The Legislature also adopted a similar law, specifically, in 2011. See W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-8-16(a) (West 2018).
194 Because the Wage Payment Collection Act previously required employee wages be paid at
least every two weeks (rather than twice monthly) and that separated employees be paid their wages
fully within four business days, multi-state employers often had to employ a third-party
administrator to separately process payroll for West Virginia's unique pay requirements. Class
action lawsuits for technical violations of the Act were frequent and costly, as the statute also
provided for liquidated damages of three times any amount paid in an untimely fashion. See S.B.
12, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (amending W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-5-1 and 21-5-4
(West 2018)); S.B. 318, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (amending W. VA. CODE ANN. § 215-3 (West 2018)).
195
See Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, 763 S.E.2d 73, 87-91 (W. Va. 2014) (finding claim
alleging nursing home was understaffed did not qualify as a "medical professional liability
action"); Phillips v. Larry's Drive-In Pharmacy, Inc., 647 S.E.2d 920, 929 (W. Va. 2007) (finding
pharmacy is not a "health care facility" or a "health care provider"); Boggs v. Camden-Clark
Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 609 S.E.2d 917, 919 (W. Va. 2004) (finding the Medical Professional Liability
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litigation that followed, 196 the legislature made a series of changes to ensure that
the law's safeguards apply to all claims related to medical services. The
legislature broadened the definitions of "health care," "health care facility," and
"health care provider" 197 and amended the definition of "medical professional
liability" to eliminate any distinction between medical negligence and other
negligence claims against a healthcare provider.1 98 The new law also provides
that expert testimony on the standard of care in a medical malpractice lawsuit
must be grounded in scientifically valid peer-reviewed studies if available.199 In
addition, it caps inflation adjustments under the state's existing limit on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases. The limits were set at
$250,000 in personal injury cases and $500,000 in cases involving catastrophic
injuries or death in 2004,200 but climbed to approximately $330,000 and
$642,000, respectively. The new law does not allow the limits to exceed 150%
of the statutory amounts ($375,000 and $750,000 respectively) without further
legislative action. 20 ' The Supreme Court of Appeals has repeatedly recognized
the legislature's authority to set and adjust a limit on subjective noneconomic
damages as a means of providing reasonable recovery to plaintiffs while
stabilizing medical liability insurance rates.20 2
In.

A TRANSPARENT AND COMPETITIVE PROCESS
FOR STATE RETENTION OF OUTSIDE COUNSEL

For two decades, West Virginia's enforcement of state law through
private attorneys whose compensation was tied to damages or fines cast a shadow
Act "does not apply to other claims that may be contemporaneous to or related to the alleged act
of medical professional liability").
196
See Hoppy Kercheval, Lawmakers Fixing Nursing Home Loophole in MedicalMalpractice
Law, METRONEWS (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.wvmetronews.com/2015/02/24/lawmakers-fixingnursing-home-loophole-in-medical-malpractice-law/ (recognizing West Virginia became among a
few states considered "ground zero" for litigation against nursing homes due to multi-million dollar
verdicts that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found outside the scope of the MPLA).
197 S.B. 6, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (amending W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-2(e)(g), (i) (West 2018)).

198 Id (amending W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-2(i) (West 2018) to include "claims that may be
contemporaneous to or related to the alleged tort or breach of contract or otherwise provided, all
in the context of rendering health care services" within definition of "medical professional
liability").
199 S.B. 6, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-7
(West 2018)).
200
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8(a)-(b) (West 2018).
201
S.B. 6, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015) (amending W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8(c)
(West 2018)).
202
See MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405,414 (W.Va. 2011); Verba v. Ghaphery,
552 S.E.2d 406, 410 (W. Va. 2001); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877,
887-88 (W.Va. 1991).
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over the state's litigation climate. Businesses were concerned that they would be
targeted by deputized contingency-fee lawyers who stood to financially gain by
using the state's broad powers to impose heavy penalties. Attorney General
Darrell McGraw (1993-2013) became known for retaining private attorneys as
"special assistant attorneys general. 2 °3 These lawyers, handpicked by the
contributors or had
Attorney General for no-bid contracts, were often campaign
20 4
close political or personal ties to the Attorney General.
After distributing a significant portion of state settlements to cover the
fees of outside counsel, what money remained was deposited in the Office of the
Attorney General's Consumer Protection Fund rather than the state's General
Revenue Fund.205 While some of the settlement money funded legitimate
consumer protection activities of the Office or may have provided restitution to
consumers, large sums were unilaterally distributed to organizations and pet
projects reflecting the Attorney General's personal preferences that often had
little or no connection to the litigation.206 Significant amounts of money also
went toward "public education," which some viewed as self-promotion for the
attorney general, during reelection years.20 7 Attorney General McGraw's

203

See Eric Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays by Coaxing Attorneys Generalto Sue, N.Y.

TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/lawyers-create-bigpaydays-by-coaxing-attorneys-general-to-sue-.html (reporting that McGraw collected more than
$2 billion worth of settlements in partnership with contingency-fee lawyers during his tenure as

West Virginia's attorney general).
204
See James R. Copland, Trial Lawyers Inc.: Attorneys General-A Report on the Alliance
Between State AGs and the Plaintiffs' Bar 2011, MANHATTAN INST. (Oct. 25, 2011),
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/trial-lawyers-inc-attomeys-general-report-alliancebetween-state-ags-and-plaintiffs-bar-2011.
205
See id.
For example, after paying private lawyers a $3 million fee, McGraw distributed a $10
206
million settlement with Purdue Pharma that resolved allegations that the company misrepresented
the potential for addiction to OxyContin to help establish a pharmacy school at the University of
Charleston, fund a nursing program run by the wife of the State Senate President, pay for a 12,000foot fitness training center for a West Virginia State Police Academy center, fund Salvation Army
Boys and Girls Clubs, and fund other programs. The state agencies in whose name McGraw sued
received virtually none of the settlement. See Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney
General Enforcement of Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging Concerns and
Solutions, 65 KAN. L. REV. 209, 255 (2016).
207
See Richie Heath, McGraw Owes West Virginians an Explanation, W. VA. REC. (Aug. 23,
2012),
https://wvrecord.com/stories/510603351-their-view-mcgraw-owes-west-virginians-anexplanation (documenting the surge of Attorney General's Office television advertising
expenditures during an election year and the Office's spending of tens of thousands of dollars of
state funds on trinkets bearing McGraw's name); see also Josh Hafenbrack, McGraw Spending
Grows, GOP CriticsAllege Political Motive for Advertising, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Mar. 9,
2004, at 1A (detailing nearly $900,000 in advertising and public relations spending by the Attorney
General's Office while both Attorney General McGraw and his brother, then-Supreme Court
Justice Warren McGraw, were both up for reelection).
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practices were roundly criticized by lawmakers, 20 8 the media, 2° 9 and think
tanks 210° and even resulted in the federal government withholding state Medicaid

funds.2 '
These practices began to change in 2013 after Patrick Morrisey narrowly
defeated McGraw on a reform platform that included altering how the state hires
outside counsel. 212 At the same time the then-new Attorney General was
developing contracting safeguards for future retention of outside counsel, the
Supreme Court of Appeals considered legal challenges to Attorney General
McGraw's previous use of outside counsel by pharmaceutical and financial
services companies who were the target of such outside counsel-driven state
enforcement actions.21 3
Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the challenges to the legality of
the use of outside counsel by the Attorney General's Office, but acknowledged
that certain parameters must be in place. In State ex rel. Discover Financial
Services, Inc. v. Nibert, the court found that while state law only specifically
authorized the Attorney General to hire and pay "assistant attorneys general"
through legislative appropriations,21 4 the Attorney General had broad and
inherent common law authority to retain "specialassistant attorneys general" and
compensate them through contingency-fee arrangements.2 5 In ruling as it did,

208

See, e.g., Hoppy Kercheval, Editorial, Legislators Are Going After Darrell McGraw, Why

Should He Not Be Bidding out Lucrative Contracts?,CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 24, 2006, at
4A; Alison Knezevich, AG Should Clear Settlements with Lawmakers, Delegate Says,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 3, 2010, at IC.
209
See, e.g., Editorial, McGraw 's Handlingof OxyContin Settlement Raises Lots of Questions,

DOMINION POST (Morgantown), Aug. 31, 2007; Editorial, The State Should Curb McGraw,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 26, 2007, at 4A; Walt Williams, The $10 Million Question, STATE
J. (W. Va.), Oct. 10, 2008, at 1.
210

See,

e.g.,

HANS BADER, COMPETITIVE

ENTER. INST.,

THE NATION'S

WORST

STATE

ATTORNEYS GENERAL 16-19 (2010); JAMES R. COPLAND, TRIAL LAWYERS INC.: ATTORNEYS
GENERAL: A REPORT ON THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN STATE AGs AND THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR 2011 7-

8, 19 (2011), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/TLl-ag.pdf.
211
See W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res. v. Sebelius, 649 F.3d 217, 224-25 (4th Cir.
2011) (finding the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services properly withheld from West
Virginia's Department of Health and Human Resources $3.2 million in Medicaid funds, reflecting
amounts from two West Virginia settlements that McGraw's office paid out to private lawyers and
outside organizations while not reimbursing Medicaid).
212
See Eric Eyre, New AG to Overhaul Operations, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 2012, at
IA.
213

See, e.g., State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 2013).

214

See id. at 647-50 (examining the language and history ofW. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-3-3 (West

2018)).
215
See id at 641-47 (emphasis added).
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the Supreme Court overruled Manchin v. Browning,216 which had previously
found that the Attorney General does not possess common law powers. 17
The Court also responded to concern that lawyers representing the state
on a contingency-fee basis have a conflict of interest because such arrangements
reward them for pursuing the highest monetary penalties, rather than injunctive
or other relief that may better serve justice and the public interest.2 1 8 Specifically,
the Court found contingency-fee arrangements permissible when (1) the
Attorney General monitors the litigation; (2) the Attorney General has not
completely abrogated authority to outside counsel and retains "ultimate control
over litigation strategy and tactics;" and (3) the trial court approves the amount
of attorneys' fees to be awarded. 21 9 The Court also summarily rejected concerns
that deputizing private attorneys to enforce state law on a contingency-fee basis
violates due process.2 2
The Court's ruling solidifying the Attorney General's inherent authority
to hire outside counsel made the adoption of policies and procedures guarding
against the appearance of impropriety and protecting the integrity of state law
enforcement and the public purse even more imperative. Soon after this decision,
Attorney General Morrisey finalized an office outside counsel policy that
formally incorporated the safeguards set forth in Nibert and made the process of
hiring and compensating outside counsel more competitive and transparent. 221
The shift was greeted as "welcome news., 222 Within one year, the new policy
had saved the state nearly $4 million.2 23 In conjunction with these outside
counsel reforms, Attorney General Morrisey also began the process of

216

296 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 1982).

217

State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 2013) (overruling

Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915 (W. Va. 1982)). While the Court recognized that the
Legislature had previously authorized the hiring of "special assistant attorneys general" in 1937,
but subsequently revoked that authority in 1953, it found that since the statute did not expressly
prohibit such hiring, the Attorney General could do so through his common law powers. See id.at

648-50.
218

See id. at 637-38.

219

See id. at 638-39.

220

See id.at 630 n.20.

221

See OFFICE OF THE W. VA. ATTORNEY GEN., POLICY No. WVAGO-004, OUTSIDE COUNSEL

POLICY (2013).
Editorial, Morrisey's New Rules Are an Improvement: Greater Transparency in Hiring
222
Outside CounselIs Welcome News, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug. 2, 2013, at 4A; see also David
Beard, A.G. Sets Policy on HiringOutside Counsel, DOMINION POST (Morgantown), July 31, 2013
(reporting support of the new policy from the U.S. Chamber Institute Legal Reform and American
Tort Reform Association).
223
See Chris Dickerson, AG"s Outside Counsel Policy Has Saved State Nearly $4M, W. VA.
REC. (June 23, 2014), https://wvrecord.com/stories/510587325-ag-s-outside-counsel-policy-has-

saved-state-nearly-4m.
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transferring surplus money from the office's Consumer Protection Fund to the
General Revenue Fund.224
The Legislature codified most aspects of Attorney General Morrisey's
outside counsel policy in 2016 to ensure that basic good government practices
continue into future administrations.225 Under this new law, before entering into
an agreement to hire outside counsel, the Attorney General must find that the use
of outside counsel would be "both cost-effective and in the public interest," by
considering a number of factors, including whether government attorneys can
sufficiently handle the matter.2 26 Upon making this finding, the Attorney General
must issue a request for proposals for private attorneys to represent the state
unless there is an emergency situation.227 Selection must be based on experience,
2 28
capacity to represent the state, and value-not personal relationships.
Consistent with Nibert, the Attorney General must maintain supervision over the
private attorneys and only the state may settle a lawsuit involving outside
counsel. 2 2 9 Attorneys' fees are subject to a sliding scale that helps avoid windfall
payments to lawyers at taxpayer expense. 23 ° The law does not permit fees to be
awarded based on civil penalties or fines. 23' Finally, the law ensures transparency
by requiring the Attorney General to post on the Office's website written findings
of need to hire outside counsel, requests for proposals, and payments to outside
counsel.2 32

224

See West Virginia AG Transfers $1OMfor Anti-Drug Efforts, W. VA. PUB. BROADCASTING

(Apr.
26,
2016),
http://www.wvpublic.org/post/west-virginia-ag-transfers- 1Om-anti-drugefforts#stream/0 (reporting Attorney General Morrisey had made five transfers totaling $33.5
million from the Consumer Protection Fund to the General Fund). Legislation that would have
capped the balance of the Consumer Protection Fund at $7 million (requiring periodic transfer to

the General Revenue Fund of any amounts above that level), allowed use of those funds by the
Office of the Attorney General "for the direct and indirect administrative, investigative,
compliance, enforcement, or litigation costs and services incurred for consumer protection
purposes," and required legislative appropriation for any other uses of such funds, passed the
legislature but was vetoed in 2018. H.B. 4009, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018).
225
See H.B. 4007, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-33a (West 2018)). In doing so, the Legislature has expressly abrogated the Attorney General's

common law authority to appoint special assistant attorneys general pursuant to the Nibert
decision.
226
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-3-3a(b) (West 2018).
227
Id. § 5-3-3a(c).
228

See id § 5-3-3a(e)

229

See id. § 5-3-3a(g).

230

See id. § 5-3-3a(h).

231

See id.

232

Id. § 5-3-3a(d), (j).
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Today, the state continues to retain outside counsel as needed. 233 The
Office of the Attorney General has made written determinations authorizing the
appointment of special assistant attorneys general to assist with representation of
a wide range of state agencies, universities, as well as the Attorney General's
Office itself where there is a need for special expertise or assistance with
litigation or compliance issues.2 34 Unlike in the past, these decisions are made in
the open, provide all attorneys with the ability to compete to provide legal service
for the state, and better serve taxpayers by protecting public funds.
IV.

WEST VIRGINIA'S NEXT STEPS

West Virginia has made impressive strides over three short legislative
sessions to tackle many of the reasons why the state's liability system had
developed a poor reputation. And the Mountain State's transformation has not
gone unnoticed.
In October 2015, then-Senate President Bill Cole and then-House
Speaker Tim Armstead were honored by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform (ILR) with the State Legislative Achievement Award in recognition of
their efforts to reform West Virginia's legal system. 235 Later that year, the
American Tort Reform Foundation removed West Virginia from its list of
"Judicial Hellholes" for the first time since the list's inception. 236 West Virginia
also rose five places between 2015 and 2017 in ILR's survey of corporate
executives and counsel on state legal climates. 237 As a result, then-West Virginia
lawmakers "have made
Secretary of Commerce Woody Thrasher noted that state
238
it easier to recruit new companies to West Virginia.,

233

The number of RFPs for outside counsel issued by the Office of the Attorney General has

varied significantly from year-to-year based on the need for legal counsel: 14 (2014), 20 (2015), 6
(2016), 7 (2017) and 13 (2018 through October 10). See Requests for Proposals & Written
Determinations,OFF. W. VA. ATT'Y GEN., https://ago.wv.gov/outsidecounsel/Pages/RFP.aspx (last
visited Oct. 10, 2018) (compilation on file with author).
234
See id.
235

See Cole, Armstead Honoredfor W. Va. Legal Reform, BLUEFIELD DAILY TELEGRAPH (Oct.

27, 2015), http://www.bdtonline.com/news/cole-armstead-honored-for-w-va-legal-reform/article_
e6a9795e-7cc5- 11 e5-999e-63713 8db4a97.html.
See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2017-2018, at 55 (2017) (removing
236
West Virginia from its list of "Judicial Hellholes" due to enactment of legal reform and moving
the state to the group's "Watch List"); see also Jeff Jenkins, Praiseand Criticismfor New Judicial
Climate Ranking, METRONEWS (Dec. 17, 2015), http://wvmetronews.com/2015/12/17/praise-andcriticism-for-new-judicial-climate-ranking/ (reporting on West Virginia's removal from the
"Judicial Hellhole" list after enactment of more than a dozen civil justice reform measures).
237

See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2017 LAWSUIT CLIMATE SURVEY: RANKING

THE STATES

238

92 (2017).

See Woody Thrasher, Despite Gains, More Needed to Aid Economy, HERALD-DISPATCH

(Oct. 22, 2017), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/opinion/woody-thrasher-despite-gains-moreneeded-to-aid-economy/article_ 8f2fl 7f-7100-558e-8fl 0-9e522208b625.html.
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However, more work remains to be done. The Legislature should
continue to build upon this progress by addressing five problem areas that call
for improvement.
A.

Establishingan IntermediateAppellate Court

First and foremost, West Virginia should address a situation that has long
cried out for change: the state's lack of an intermediate appellate court.
Meaningful appellate review is a critical component of a fair justice system.
When trial courts improperly admit prejudicial or unreliable evidence, allow
novel theories of liability that are unsupported by law, place barriers on the
ability to mount a defense, or sustain excessive verdicts, litigants depend on
appellate review to correct the error. Full appellate review also helpfully
establishes precedent that instructs trial courts on how to properly apply the law
and avoid errors in the future. 3 9
West Virginia falls short of this standard. Its single appellate court, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, is left to address every appeal that
arrives from the state's 55 circuit courts, composed of about 70 judges, as well
as decide appeals from other state courts, consider court rules, and administer the
judicial branch. Most state judicial systems provide significantly more access to
meaningful appellate review. Unlike West Virginia, 41 states have at least one
intermediate appellate court, most of which provide for an appeal of civil cases
as a matter of right.24 °
Until recently, review of civil cases in the Supreme Court of Appeals
was wholly discretionary, often leaving parties with no appeal at all. In fact,
between 1999 and 2008, the Court declined to hear 69% of civil appealsincluding cases involving verdicts of $220 million and $400 million-and 84%
of criminal appeals.24 ' On several occasions, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked

239
See, e.g., Andrew Graham & Cole DeLancey, 2012 Survey on Oil & Gas: West Virginia, 18
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 675, 679-80 (2012) (observing that development of West Virginia law is
"seriously impeded" by the state's lack of an intermediate appellate court, which results in

"incongruent and redundant development of the case law").
See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT STRUCTURE
CHARTS, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/StateCourtStructureCharts.aspx
(last
visited Aug. 27, 2018).
241
Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REv. 1219, 1235 (2013).
Concerns with the lack of appellate review also arise in the criminal context. See, e.g., Linnsey
240

Evick, A Door Closed: The Right to Full Appellate Review of Sentences of Life Imprisonment

Without Parolein West Virginia, 112 W. VA. L. REv. 241, 249-50 (2009) (finding that "of the
eleven states with no intermediate appellate court, West Virginia is now the only state that does
not provide mandatory full review of its harshest criminal sentence, life imprisonment without
parole").
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to intervene, but denied certiorari.24 2 Now, as discussed below, parties are
entitled to a limited, insufficient form of review.243
In 2009, then-Governor Joe Manchin created an Independent
Commission on Judicial Reform, chaired by retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor.24 4 The Commission was created to address troubling
trends, including "the erosion of the public's confidence in the State's judicial
system," and "the voluminous caseload before the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals. 24 5 The Commission found that while the number of cases heard by
West Virginia's high court remained stable, the number of appeals had doubled.
The Commission concluded that "[b]y virtually any measure, the Supreme Court
of Appeals is one of the busiest state appellate courts in the entire country. 246
The Commission recognized that while many other states initially had a single
appellate court, as caseloads grew post-1950, the number of states with
intermediate appellate courts tripled.2 47 By 2000, Chief Justice Elliott Maynard
declared, "You don't have to be a mathematician to figure out that West Virginia
needs an intermediate appellate court., 248 Accordingly, the Commission
recommended creation of an intermediate court of appeals that would "ease the
burden on the Supreme Court of Appeals, free the high court to continue hearing
legal issues and expand the
a discretionary docket focused on important or novel
' 249
core functions of our appellate judicial system. ,
The Supreme Court of Appeals, however, opted to marginally expand its
own appellate review of cases, rather than advocate for creating an intermediate
appellate court.2 ° When overhauling its appellate rules in 2011, the Court
provided for mandatory review of all trial court decisions. 25' The new rules do
not provide for full, traditional appellate review. Rather, the Court adopted an
abridged form of review under which it drafts a "concise statement" of its

242

Robertson, supra note 241, at 1235 n.73 (citing cases).

243

Roy PERRY, CASELOAD CHARACTERISTICS: UNDERSTANDING THE WORKLOAD OF THE WEST

SUPREME COURT (Dec. 2015), http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/clerk/pdf/
CaseloadCharacteristics-2015.pdf ("Before 2011, all appeals were discretionary; they were
reviewed, but about three-fourths were refused with no explanation and no decision on the
VIRGINIA

merits.").
244
245
246

See State ex rel. Loughry v. Tennant, 732 S.E.2d 507, 510 (W. Va. 2012).
Id.
W. VA. INDEP. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL REFORM, FINAL REPORT 8 (2009) [hereinafter

JUDICIAL

REFORM FINAL REP.].
247

Id. at 31.

Elliott E. Maynard, West Virginia Needs an Intermediate Appellate Court, W. VA. LAW.,
July 2000, at 8; see also Chief Justice Elliott E. Maynard, State of the Judiciary Address (May 12,
2000), W. VA. LAW., June 2000, at 8 (calling for establishment of an intermediate appellate court).
249
JUDICIAL REFORM FINAL REP., supra note 246, at 8.
250
See PERRY, supra note 243, at 2.
248

251

Id.
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reasoning. 2 These memorandum decisions usually affirm the trial court. They
are unsigned, unpublished, and, while citable, have low precedential value.2 5 3 In
fact, the Court recently overturned a series of memorandum decisions, explaining
that its abbreviated decisions had not fully, thoroughly, and thoughtfully
considered the issues, 2 54 calling into doubt the value of these rulings as a source
of law.25 5
In addition, while the new rule curbs the issue of parties having no right
to appeal, it does not address the Commission's concern regarding the workload
the Court faces. Between 2006 and 2010, under the old rules, the Court refused
12,050 petitions for appeal, from 2011 to 2015; under the new rules, zero
petitions were refused.2 5 6 As the already-busy Court takes on substantially more
appeals, parties rarely get the benefit of a full appeal because the court
overwhelmingly issues short memoranda as opposed to fully considered and
explained decisions.2 57 In 2015, only 11.5% of the court's 949 merits decisions
were signed opinions, and in 2016, 13.4% of the 861 merit-based decisions were
signed opinions.258 Many attorneys, organizations, and other observers agree that
this half step is inadequate. 9
Meanwhile, other states continue to move forward in providing more
meaningful appellate review. As the Commission's report observed, in the
decade preceding its 2009 report, three states with smaller caseloads than West
Virginia (Mississippi, Nebraska, and Utah) had established intermediate
252

See W. VA. R. APP. P. 21.

253

State v. McKinley, 764 S.E.2d 303, 313 (W. Va. 2014).

254

Hammons v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm'r, 775 S.E.2d 458, 475 (W. Va. 2015); see also

State v. Deel, 788 S.E.2d 741, 748-49 (W. Va. 2016) (finding analysis of ex post facto principles
in two memorandum decisions issued in 2012 and 2015 "erroneous" and "incorrect").
255
More recently, the Court has attempted to "reassure the legal community and the public that

'there is no question that memorandum decisions are pronouncements on the merits that fully
comply with the constitutional requirements to address every point fairly arising upon the record
and to state the reasons for a decision concisely in writing."' In re Involuntary Hospitalization of
T.O., 796 S.E.2d 564, 572 (W. Va. 2017) (quoting McKinley, 764 S.E.2d at 311; see also SWVA,
Inc. v. Birch, 787 S.E.2d 664, 668 (W. Va. 2016) (citing a series of memorandum decisions issued
in workers' compensation context and finding "the doctrine of stare decisis supports our decision
in this case").
256
See PERRY, supranote 243, at 1-2.
257

See W. VA. SUPREME COURT CLERK'S OFFICE, SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST

VIRGINIA

QUICK

REFERENCE

FACTS

(2017)

[hereinafter

QUICK

REFERENCE

FACTS],

http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/clerk/statistics/15-16QuickFacts.pdf, see also W. VA.
JUDICIAL COMP. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 2017) (citing the West Virginia Supreme Court of

Appeals' number one ranking in the nation in incoming cases per 100,000 people and an increased
workload resulting from the new appellate rules as justification for a pay raise proposal for
justices).
258

See QUICK REFERENCE FACTS, supra note 257.

259
See Stephanie Zwerner, Note, Betterfor Business, Better for Justice: Why West Virginia
Needs an IntermediateAppellate Court, 117 W. VA. L. REv. 429, 438 (2014).
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appellate courts.2 60 Since that time, voters in Nevada, one of the few states aside
from West Virginia that did not have an intermediate appellate court, approved
a constitutional amendment creating a court of appeals. 26' As the Nevada
judiciary recognized, the new court, which began hearing cases in 2015, reduces
the burden on the state's high court, "allowing the Supreme Court to spend more
time on the cases that merit published decisions. 2 62
Legislation to establish an intermediate appellate court (IAC) that
provides all litigants with full appellate review has been repeatedly introduced,
but has fallen short of enactment.263 The latest proposal, the West Virginia
Appellate Review Reorganization Act of 2018, would have divided the IAC into
two panels, each with three judges, serving a Northern District and Southern
District. 264 The Governor would nominate judges to fill these positions, subject
to Senate confirmation, to serve staggered ten-year terms. 65 The bill would have
provided parties with an appeal of a wide range of final judgments to the JAC as
a matter of right.266 The legislation would have required that the IAC provide
each appeal "full and meaningful review, and an opportunity to be heard" as well
as a written decision on the merits. 267 The Senate passed the legislation2 69by a 2311 vote on February 15, 20 18,268 but the measure stalled in the House.
Why did the IAC proposal fall short? Although most West Virginians
support establishing an intermediate appellate court,27 ° some members of the

260

JUDICIAL REFORM FINAL REP., supra note 246, at31,

261

Court

Appeals,

of

NEVADA

COURTS,

https://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/CourtInformation/Court of Appeals/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2018).
262

Id.

263

See Brad McElhinny, Intermediate Court of Appeals Gets Another Legislative Review,

METRONEWS (Jan.28, 2018), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/01/28/intermediate-court-of-appeals-

gets-another-legislative-review/ (reporting that proposals for an intermediate appellate court were
considered in 1999, 2003, 2010,2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014).
264 S.B. 341, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va.2018).
265

Id.

266

Id.

267

Id.

268

Id. (passed 23-11 on Feb. 15, 2018).

269

A two-week teacher strike near the close of the 2018 session that brought the legislature to

a near standstill contributed to the IAC bill's failure to further advance. See Jess Bidgood, West
Virginia Raises Teachers' Pay to End Statewide Strike, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/us/west-virginia-teachers-strike-deal.html.
270
David Yates, Poll Shows WV Voters Believe Lawsuits Hurting Job Creation, WASH.
EXAMINER

(Mar. 20,

2014),

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/poll-shows-wv-voters-

believe-lawsuits-hurting-job-creation.
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Supreme Court of Appeals 27 1 and the plaintiffs' bar2 72 actively opposed the
proposal. Opponents say West Virginia's appellate caseload does not warrant an
appellate court and, given the Supreme Court of Appeals' review of every case
to some degree, additional review is unnecessary. 273 The plaintiffs' bar also
2 74
asserts that additional appellate review would result in "unnecessary delays.
Such "delays," however, are a byproduct of ensuring that parties receive justice.
The main sticking point, however, is the cost of the new court for the
state. Estimates of that cost widely vary. In 2017, the plaintiffs' bar asserted that
an JAC would cost the state $30 million to $40 million annually. 275 The following
year, the Supreme Court of Appeals published a fiscal note anticipating that a
fully functioning IAC would cost $11.7 million to implement and then about
$10.3 million per year thereafter.276 While this is a significantly lower sum than
suggested by the plaintiffs' bar, it still suggests the Court's predisposition against
establishing the new court. Legislative leaders view that estimate as wildly
inflated, calling it "comical" that operating a six-member court would cost more
than running the entire State Senate, which costs less than $8 million.277 In
contrast, the Senate Finance Committee predicts that the new court would cost
about $3 million per year. 278 Since the West Virginia Constitution has uniquely
given the Supreme Court of Appeals sole authority to set the judiciary's

271

See, e.g., Ry Rivard, Supreme Court JusticeSays State Doesn't Need to AddAppeals Court,

CHARLESTON GAZETrE-MAIL

(Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/politics/

supreme-court-justice-says-state-doesnt-need-to-add-appeals/article_dOOf1 52b-5d 15-5290-a83e2cde8fa37dl6.html (reporting then-Chief Justice Menis Ketchum's position that an IAC would be
a "waste of money"); The Hon. Margaret L. Workman, Intermediate Appeals Court: We Don't
Need It and We Can't Afford It, W. VA. LAW., Apr.-June 2011, http://www.courtswv.gov/publicresources/press/cj-column/Workman-Apr-June-2011 .html.
272
See Linda Harris, Intermediate Court Concept Drawing Criticism, Praisein West Virginia,
STATE J. (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.wvnews.com/statejournalllaw/intermediate-court-conceptdrawing-criticism-praise-in-west-virginia/article c690b1b5-5c3d-5b0b-9149554bebab4457.html; Carrie Hodousek, Trial Lawyers Group Opposes Bill to Create Intermediate
Court in W Va., METRONEWS (Feb. 17, 2017), http://wvmetronews.com/2017/02/17/trial-lawyersgroup-opposes-bill-to-create-intermediate-court-in-w-va/.
273
Harris, supra note 272 (reporting position of Beth White, executive director of the West
Virginia Association for Justice).
274
Id.(quoting West Virginia Association President-elect Stephen New).
275

Hodousek, supranote 272 (quoting Ms. White).

276

W.

VA. SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS, CBD No. 1958, FISCAL NOTE TO THE DRAFT

COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE S.B. 341 (2018); see also Brad McElhinny, Supreme CourtEstimates Cost
of Intermediate Court at $11.7 Million, METRONEWS (Feb. 6, 2018), http://wvmetronews.com/
2018/02/06/supreme-court-estimates-cost-of-intermediate-court-at- 11-7-million/.
277
Jeff Jenkins, Carmichael Calls Intermediate Court Fiscal Note "Comical," METRONEWS
(Feb. 7, 2018), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/02/07/carmichael-calls-intermediate-court-fiscalnote-comical/ (quoting Senate President Mitch Carmichael).
278
Harris, supra note 272.
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budget, 27 9 the Court's estimate matters most. 280 In 2018, opponents pitted the

such as
Court's estimate of the cost of the JAC against other state priorities,
28
'
increasing teacher salaries and addressing the state's opioid crisis.

As proponents have observed, "West Virginia's entire judicial system is
a mere three percent of the state's budget. 2 82 Adding an additional level of
appellate review would not have a significant effect on taxpayer funds.
system
Advocates for an JAC also recognize that "[t]he benefit to the state's legal
283
and attractiveness to businesses would far justify the additional cost.

Meanwhile, the Court has itself come under fire for wasteful spending. 84
Public confidence in the Court may be at an all-time low following the adoption
of impeachment articles by the House of Delegates against all four sitting justices
stemming from this spending and other allegations of misconduct. 285 With the
279

See W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 51(5) (prohibiting the legislature from decreasing a budget

item relating to the judiciary); see also Hoppy Kercheval, State Supreme Court Getting Close
Scrutiny by the Legislature, METRONEWS (Feb. 9, 2018), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/02/09/

260875/.
In the 2018 legislative session, the State Senate and House of Delegates overwhelmingly
280
passed a resolution proposing a constitutional amendment that would give the legislature control
of the judiciary's budget, with certain safeguards. See S.J.R. 3, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va.
2018). West Virginians approved the amendment in November 2018, which may pave the way for
the legislature to fund an IAC within the judiciary's existing budget. See Brad McElhinny,
Amendment is Approvedfor Lawmakers to Have More JudicialBudget Oversight, METRONEWS
(Nov. 6, 2018), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/11/06/amendment-is-approved-for-lawmakers-tohave-more-judicial-budget-oversight/.
Jeff Jenkins, Need, Cost of Intermediate Court Questioned Before Senate Passes Bill,
281
METRONEWS (Feb. 15, 2018), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/02/15/need-cost-of-intermediatecourt-questioned-before-senate-passes-bill! (quoting West Virginia Association for Justice
statement released on the day of the Senate vote).
West Virginia Needs an Intermediate Court of Appeals, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Jan.
282
5, 2015), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/opinion/editorial-west-virginia-needs-an-intermediatecourt-of-appeals/article f23ca834-f540-54e1 -aafe-0c92462636ff.html.
283
Zwerner, supra note 259, at 468.
284
Hoppy Kercheval, State Supreme Court Spends Big on Office Furniture,METRONEwS (Nov.
http://wvmetronews.com/2017/11/15/state-supreme-court-spends-big-on-office2017),
15,
furniture/ (reporting spending $3.7 million to renovate court offices with $32,000 on a single
couch, $1,700 for throw pillows, and $7,500 for a floor medallion outlining the counties of the
state in the Chief Justice's office).
285
Justice Menis Ketchum retired from the Court prior to pleading guilty to a federal wire fraud
count relating to his personal use of a state-owned vehicle. See All of West Virginia's Supreme
Court Justices Impeached Over Spending, Assoc. PRESS (Aug. 14, 2018, 5:02 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/all-west-virginia-s-supreme-court-justices-impeachedover-spending-n900461; Brad McElhinny, Impeachment Day 8: Delegates Vote on Articles
Impeaching All WV Justices, METRONEWS (Aug. 7, 2018), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/08/07/
impeachment-day-8-case-continues-on-supreme-court/; Lacie Pierson, WV House Judiciary
Introduces Articles of Impeachment Against All Supreme Court Justices, CHARLESTON GAZETTEMAIL (Aug. 7, 2018), https://wvpress.org/breaking-news/wv-house-judiciary-introduces-articlesof-impeachment-against-all-supreme-court-justices/.
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recent resignation of Justice Allen H. Loughry II, three new justices will be
sitting on the Court by year's end. 86 Consequently, this may be precisely the
time to build further accountability into the judicial system and preserve access
to appellate review by establishing an JAC.
B. Abandoning West Virginia's Outlier Medical MonitoringLaw
West Virginia should place needed, common sense constraints on the
ability of people who are not injured but allege exposure to a toxic substance to
recover damages for medical monitoring.
Everyone is exposed to small amounts of potentially harmful substances
in their daily lives. Allowing claims based purely on exposure can lead to highly
speculative lawsuits on behalf of many people who will never develop an injury.
In some cases, medical monitoring cannot prevent an illness and there may be no
benefit to early detection. There is also no certainty that plaintiffs, if given cash
awards, will use the money for medical testing. For these reasons, most courts
have rejected medical monitoring claims brought on behalf of people without a
present physical injury or placed significant constraints on such claims.
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a claim for medical monitoring
under a federal tort law substitute for workers' compensation in the railroad
industry. The Court rejected the claim as "beyond the bounds of currently
'evolving common law."'' 287 The Court was concerned that "tens of millions of
individuals" might qualify for some form of substance-exposure-related medical
monitoring. 288 Courts would be flooded with questionable cases, defendants
would face uncertain liability, and those who actually develop an injury would

286

West Virginia voters recently selected former Congressman Evan Jenkins and former House
Speaker Tim Armstead to fill the two court vacancies created by the retirements of Justices Menis
Ketchum and Robin Davis. See Caity Coyne, Armstead, Jenkins Win Supreme Court Races,
CHARLESTON

GAZETTE-MAIL
(Nov.
6,
2018), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/election_2018/armstead-jenkins-win-supreme-courtraces/article f369ac31-b86c-541f-845a-17937a4ae3c6.html. With the West Virginia Senate
rejecting the single Article of Impeachment against Justice Beth Walker and five temporary justices
to the West Virginia Supreme Court blocking the impeachment trial against Chief Justice Margaret
Workman, Justice Loughry's resignation created a final vacancy to be filled by Governor Jim
Justice until the May 2020 election. See Phil Kabler, Walker Receives Public Reprimand,Keeps
Seat
on
Supreme
Court,
CHARLESTON
GAZETrE-MAIL
(Oct.
2,
2018), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/cops and courts/walker-receives-publicreprimand-keeps-seat-on-supreme-court/article 2d023c84-1 cel -5010-8d7796a4f45d7f3b.html; see also Jeff Morris, Supreme Court Will Not Reconsider Ruling that Blocked
Impeachment Trialsfor Justices,WCHS (Nov. 21, 2018), https://wchstv.com/news/local/supremecourt-will-not-reconsider-ruling-that-blocked-impeachment-trials-for-justices; Jeff
Jenkins, Loughry Resigns from Supreme Court, METRONEWS (Nov. 10, 2018, 7:13
PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/11/1 0/loughry-resigns-from-supreme-court/.
287
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Corp. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 440 (1997).

288

Id.at 442.
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have less chance of recovery after the depletion of resources for medical testing,
the U.S. Supreme Court found.2 89
While other states followed this path, 9 ° West Virginia took a different
route. In a highly criticized case in 1999, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals allowed cash awards for medical monitoring without a present physical
injury. 291 It permitted such claims even if the amount of exposure to a toxic
substance is insufficient to cause injury and regardless of whether there is a
medical benefit to early detection of a disease.292 Rather, the court allowed a
lump sum recovery "based on the subjective desires of a plaintiff for
information. 293 A dissenting justice cautioned:
[T]he practical effect of this decision is to make almost every
West Virginian a potential plaintiff in a medical monitoring
cause of action. Those who work in heavy industries such as
coal, oil, gas, timber, steel, and chemicals as well as those who
work in older office buildings, or handle ink in newspaper
offices, or launder the linens in hotels have, no doubt, come into
contact with hazardous substances. Now all of these people may
be able to collect money as victorious plaintiffs without any
showing of injury at all.
Indeed, that is what occurred. In 2011, DuPont settled a lawsuit over
concerns regarding a zinc smelter plant in Harrison County, West Virginia,
setting aside $4 million for medical monitoring and providing $400 payments for
those who completed a claim form. According to the claims administrator, 4,000
people signed up for the initial round of the medical monitoring program, but

289

Id.

A flurry of state supreme courts followed the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in rapid
succession. See Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001); Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002); Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005); Paz
v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2007); Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16
P.3d 435 (Nev. 2000); Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181 (Or. 2008). When New
York's highest court rejected medical monitoring claims in 2013, it recognized that "[t]he
requirement that a plaintiff sustain physical harm before being able to recover in tort is a
fundamental principle of our state's tort system" and that a new cause of action has "the potential
for vast uncircumscribed liability." Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 5 N.E.3d 11, 14, 17 (N.Y.
2013). While the high courts of Maryland and Massachusetts permitted medical monitoring claims
during this period, they tightly circumscribed the conditions for bringing an action and, unlike
West Virginia, did not allow cash awards. See Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d
891, 902 (Mass. 2009); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 71 A.3d 30 (Md. 2013); see also Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Ford, 71 A.3d 105 (Md. 2013).
291 Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 426-30 (W. Va. 1999).
290

292

Id. at 433-34.

293

Id.

294

Id. at 435 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
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only half went through with the testing.2 95 Another 2,000 people just took the
cash.29 6 As the CharlestonDaily Mail observed, "Who would turn down a quick
"

$400

297

To its credit, the Supreme Court of Appeals drew the line at punitive
damages, ruling that a medical monitoring claim in which the plaintiffs have
alleged only a future risk of harm, not a present harm, is insufficient to impose
such punishment. 298 Even with this constraint, West Virginia's medical

monitoring99 law remains an outlier. The only state to take a similar approach is
2
Missouri.

The Legislature should bring West Virginia's medical monitoring law in
line with other states. At minimum, the law should require placement of recovery
in an action seeking future medical monitoring costs into a court-supervised
fund, rather than paying out cash. 300 This fund would reimburse the medical
expenses of plaintiffs until the court finds that the medical surveillance,
screening tests, or monitoring procedures are no longer required. In addition,
legislation should require a plaintiff to show some present injury or diagnosis
before payment of future medical monitoring expenses or establish strict
standards to qualify. Claims should be allowed only when an individual shows
he or she was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance due to a
defendant's conduct, has a substantially higher risk of contracting a latent disease
than the general public as a result of that exposure, and that early detection of
that disease is possible and beneficial. The West Virginia Senate unanimously

295

See Matt Harvey, Spelter Smelter Settlement Winding Down in HarrisonCounty, ExPoNENT

(Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.wvnews.com/theet/news/local/spelter-smelter-settlementwinding-down-in-harrison-county/article 7cc5989f-4869-5ae4-87fa-ea1309651d8a.html.
296
See id
297
See Editorial, Who Would Turn Down a Quick $400?, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 14,
2011, at 4A.
298
See Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 694 S.E.2d 815, 933-34 (W. Va. 2010).
Nevertheless, the court in that case sustained a $117.7 million punitive damage award, reasoning
that 60% of jury's $196.2 million punitive damage award stemmed from property damage claims
and the remaining 40% was associated with medical monitoring claims. See id at 931-32.
299
See Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Mo. 2007); see also Mark
A. Behrens & Christopher E. Appel, Medical Monitoring in Missouri After Meyer ex rel. Coplin
v. Fluor Corp.: Sound Policy Should Be Restored to a Vague and Unsound Directive,27 ST. Louis
U. PUB. L. REv. 135 (2007). The Vermont Legislature passed a bill authorizing broad recovery for
medical monitoring in 2018, but was vetoed by Governor Phil Scott. See S. 197, 2017-18 Leg.,
Reg. Sess., (Vt. 2018). Governor Scott expressed concern that the "level of liability and uncertainty
this legislation creates for employers could prove catastrophic" for the state's economy and that
the bill would "sacrifice provable and scientific evidence in favor of claims that are speculative,
conceptual, abstract, and subject to very low levels of proof." See Gov. Philip B. Scott, Veto
Message, S.197, May 23, 2018.
300
For other important safeguards, see generally Victor E. Schwartz et al., MedicalMonitoring:
The Right Way and the Wrong Way, 70 Mo. L. REv. 349 (2005).
TELEGRAM
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passed legislation along these lines in March 2017,301 but the House did not act
on the bill before the Legislature adjourned.
C. ProvidingJurorswith FullInformation to Decide Auto Accident Cases
One of the first questions people ask after learning of a car accident is,
"were they wearing their seatbelts?" Certainly, this question also comes into the
minds of jurors deliberating an automobile accident case. Yet, West Virginia law
limits the ability of jurors to have this question answered. The Legislature should
amend West Virginia law to provide that use or nonuse of a seatbelt by any driver
or passenger is admissible in any civil action as evidence of comparative
negligence or failure to mitigate damages.3 °2
Historically, states did not allow juries to hear evidence of seatbelt use
for two understandable reasons. First, when states followed the rule of
contributory negligence, any degree of fault on the part of the plaintiff fully
barred recovery. West Virginia, however, abandoned the contributory negligence
defense and replaced it with comparative fault in 1979.303 Since that time, a
plaintiff's contribution to an injury only reduces recovery in proportion to his or
her degree of fault.
Second, states did not initially have laws mandating seatbelt use and,
when they enacted such laws, scientific research had not fully established how
critical seatbelts are to safety. Society had also not fully embraced seatbelt use.
That remained the case in 1993, when West Virginia first required drivers, frontseat passengers, and children to wear seatbelts.3 °
As part of that law, West Virginia adopted a unique procedure for
considering seatbelt use in litigation. The law allows a trial court judge to
consider seatbelt nonuse outside the view of the jury to determine whether an
injured party's failure to wear a seatbelt caused his or her injuries.30 5 If the judge
finds that the failure to wear a seatbelt was a proximate cause of the injuries, the
jury learns of the nonuse, but may reduce recovery by no more than five
percent.30 6 If the injured party stipulates that his or her failure to wear a seatbelt
contributed to the injury, the court forgoes a hearing and automatically withholds
five percent of any future damages award.30 7 In such cases, the jury never hears
evidence of the seatbelt nonuse. That law may have been ahead of its time

301

S.B. 236, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017) (passed 33-0 on Mar. 7, 2017).

302

Legislation along these lines was introduced, but did not advance, in 2017 and 2018. See

S.B. 606, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018); H.B. 4367, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018);
H.B. 2581, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017).
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
303
304

H.B. 2098, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1993).

305

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C- 15-49(d) (West 2018).

306

Id.

307

Id.
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25 years ago, but it is now obsolete as it fails to recognize several major shifts
that have occurred.
A wealth of research now conclusively establishes that buckling up
reduces injuries and saves lives. According to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, wearing seatbelts prevents over 14,000 deaths each
year.3 °8 In 2016, about 48% of people killed in crashes were not wearing
seatbelts. 30 9 The public fully understands and accepts the importance of wearing
seatbelts. For example, before West Virginia participated in a "Click It or Ticket"
campaign in 2001, less than half of West Virginians used seatbelts.31 ° After that
campaign, seatbelt use jumped
to 71.6%.31 In 2013, 82.2% of West Virginians
312
were wearing seatbelts.
Until that year, seatbelt use remained a "secondary offense" in West
Virginia, meaning that police officers could not stop someone solely for not
wearing a seatbelt, but could enforce the seatbelt law only in combination with
another offense, such as speeding.3 13 After nine years of legislative
consideration, the legislature made failure to wear a seatbelt a primary traffic
offense in 2013.3'4 Now, law enforcement officers may pull over any vehicle in
which the driver, any front seat passenger, or any passenger under 18 years of
age in the backseat are unbuckled and fine them.31 5 The change was expected to
boost seatbelt use in West Virginia. 3 16 In 2016, an observational survey
conducted by the Governor's Highway Safety Program estimated the state's
seatbelt usage rate had climbed to 86.8%.317
Given today's understanding of the importance of seatbelt use, adoption
of comparative fault, and the evolution of how seatbelt laws are enforced, there
is no justification for hiding evidence from juries as to whether drivers and

308

Seat Belts,

NAT'L HIGHWAY

TRAFFIC

SAFETY ADMIN.,

https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-

driving/seat-belts (last visited Aug. 20, 2018).
309
Id.
310

Highway Safety Performance PlanFY2OIO, W. VA. Div. MOTOR VEHICLES & W. VA. DEP'T

TRANSP. 2, https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/wvfyIOhsp.pdf

(last visited Aug. 27,

2018) (indicating 49.5% seatbelt usage rate in 2001).
311

Id. at 14.

312

W. VA.

2013

GOVERNOR'S

HIGHWAY

SAFETY PROGRAM,

ANN.

REP.

1

(2013),

transportation.wv.gov/DMV/DMVFormSearch/WVGHSP-2013-Annual-Report-wf.pdf.
313
See H.B. 2108, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2013).
314

See Malak Khader, Legislature Passes Primary Offense Seatbelt Law, 24 WRAP-UP, no. 7

(Apr. 13, 2013), www.wvlegislature.gov/wrapup/pdfsiVol.XXIV-issue7.pdf.
315

W. VA. CODEANN. § 17C-15-49(a), (c) (West 2018).

316

W. VA. Div. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, ANN. REP. 1 (2016), https://transportation.wv.gov/DMV/

DMVFormSearchlDMVAnnualReport 2016.pdf.
317

ObservationalSurvey of Safety Belt Use, W. VA. Div. OF MOTOR VEHICLES & W. VA. DEP'T

OF TRANSP. 1, https://transportation.wv.gov/DMV/DMVFormSearch/GHSPFY16_SEAT-BELTSUVEY.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2018).
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passengers were wearing seatbelts or allowing no more than a five percent
reduction in damages. In one state that recently abandoned a prohibition on
seatbelt evidence, a unanimous supreme court referred to the exclusionary rule
as "an anachronism," a "vestige of a bygone legal system," and an "oddity in
light of modem societal norms."3 18 Keeping this law in place blindfolds the jury
from fairly considering irresponsible (and illegal) behavior, as it would in any

other personal injury case.3 19
D. EliminatingPredatoryLawsuit Lending
West Virginia should subject lawsuit lending to the same types of
safeguards governing other businesses that provide consumer loans or credit.
An industry has emerged in which companies offer immediate cash to
consumers who are plaintiffs in personal injury claims. These "cash advances"
must be paid back to the lender with interest and fees out of the plaintiff's
settlement or judgment. The loans often come with exorbitant interest rates and
large fees. 320 The Wall Street Journal has called these arrangements "the legal
equivalent of the payday loan."32 1 Plaintiffs' lawyers observe that if the litigation
does not quickly settle, the accumulated interest on a lawsuit loan is likely to
leave their clients with little, if any, recovery.32 2 Those that represent business
interests express concern that lawsuit lending may prolong litigation and inflate
settlement values.323 The New York Times recently exposed how these loans have
served as a "funding machine" for mass tort litigation where, without adequate
explanation to clients, they have been used to entice women to remove pelvic

See Nabors Well Servs., Ltd., v. Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tex. 2015).
See id. at 566 ("The result [of the exclusionary rule] is certainly an oddity: the unbelted
plaintiff is likely to be punished with a criminal citation carrying a monetary fine from the police
officer investigating the accident, but in the civil courtroom his illegal conduct will be rewarded
by monetary compensation.").
320
Ashby Jones, Loan & Order: States Object to 'Payday'Lawsuit Lending, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
28, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424127887324743704578446903171978648;
see also Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured,N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/business/17lawsuit.html (finding "the rates charged
by lawsuit lenders often exceed 100 % a year").
318

319

321

Jones, supra note 320.

Id. (citing comments of Anthony Leone, who serves as president of the Rhode Island
322
Association for Justice); see also Appelbaum, supra note 320 (quoting Robert J. Genis, a personal
injury lawyer, as referring to lawsuit lending as "legal loan sharking" and indicating that he warns
clients against such borrowing).
Jones, supra note 320 (quoting Harold Kim, Executive Vice President of the U.S. Chamber
323
of Commerce Institute of Legal Reform).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

49

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121

mesh devices not because surgery was medically necessary, but because the
removal of the device would improve the chance of a settlement.32 4
Plaintiffs who lose their cases are not obligated to repay the loan. This
distinction allows lawsuit lenders to call the process "non-recourse" funding in
which they provide a cash advance, 325 not a loan subject to safeguards applicable
to other lenders. While payday lending is effectively illegal in West Virginia
because such arrangements are subject to strong usury laws that prohibit
excessive interest rates,326 lawsuit lending circumvents these laws.
Several states have protected consumers by enacting legislation that
governs lawsuit lending, such as Oklahoma (2013), Tennessee (2014), Arkansas
(2015), and Indiana (2016).327 West Virginia should take similar action.328 The
law might require lenders to register with the state and post a surety bond, allow
consumers to cancel a lawsuit lending contract within five days, and set a
maximum interest rate and fee limits consistent with West Virginia's usury
law.32 9 In addition, the law should guard against conflicts of interest by ensuring
that lenders do not attempt to influence a consumer's case. For example, the law
324
See Matthew Goldstein & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, How Profiteers Lure Women Into
Often-Unneeded Surgery, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/
business/vaginal-mesh-surgery-lawsuits-financing.html. Most of the pelvic mesh cases-over
100,000 claims-were transferred to federal multidistrict litigation in West Virginia. See MDL
Statistics Report - Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets by District, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON
MULTIDISTRICTLITIG. 6 (Aug. 15, 2018), www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/pml/files/PendingMDL_
Dockets B District-August-15-2018.pdf.
325
See, e.g., West Virginia Lawsuit Funding, ALLIANCE CLAIM FUNDING, LLC, http://
www.allianceclaimfunding.com/west-virginia-lawsuit-funding (last visited Aug. 20, 2018); West
VirginiaLawsuit Loans, TRIMARK LEGAL FUNDING Co., https://tlfllc.com/state/west-virginia/ (last
visited Aug. 20, 2018); see also West Virginia Lawsuit Funding, CASH FOR LAWSUITS,
https://cashforlawsuits.com/lawsuit-advance-funding-case-types/west-virginia-lawsuit-funding/
(last visited Aug. 20, 2018) (describing its service as "non-recourse advances").
326
West Virginia law sets maximum rates for consumer loans ranging from 31% APR (loan of
$2,000 or less), 27% APR (loan between $2,000 and $10,000), and 18% APR (loan of over
$10,000). See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-4-107(1)-(3) (West 2018).
327
See S.B. 882, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 457-109 (West 2018)); H.B. 1127, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016) (codified at IND. CODE ANN. § 244.5-1-101.1 (West 2018)); S.B. 1360, 2014 Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-16-101 et seq. (West 2018)); H.B. 84, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2016) (codified at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 2251 to 2260 (West 2018)).
328
By way of comparison, the state Senate engaged in lengthy and heated debate this past
session on legislation that would have increased the amount of money high-risk consumers could
borrow on already regulated high-interest loans. See Rusty Marks, Senate Approves Consumer
Loan Bill in Party-Line Vote, WVNEWS (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.wvnews.com/news/wvnews/
senate-approves-consumer-loan-bill-in-party-line-vote/articled318451 b- 1253-525b-9bbc47adcbb519cd.html.
329
See generally General Thurbert Baker, Paying to Play: Inside the Ethics and Implications
of Third-Party Litigation Financing,23 WIDENER L.J. 229, 241 (2013) (highlighting cases of
predatory lawsuit lending and concluding "lenders should-at the very least-be subject to state
usury, truth-in-lending, and other consumer protection laws").
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might prohibit lawsuit lenders from accepting referral fees or other payments
from law firms or from referring consumers to particular lawyers, law firms, or
medical providers.
E. PreventingPatientHarmfrom Misleading Lawsuit Advertising
West Virginia should prohibit misleading practices in lawsuit
advertising that scare patients into stopping their prescribed medications and
discourage people from seeking medical treatment.
The number of advertisements for legal services on television has tripled
over the past decade, with the largest portion targeting prescription drugs and
medical devices. 330 The internet is also inundated with websites, videos, and
advertisements on social media that seek plaintiffs for mass tort suits. 33' These
advertisements are often presented as "medical alerts," suggest an affiliation with
the FDA, and warn that taking a drug can result in dire consequences, such as
are remote, understood by
death, even when the chance of such complications
332
doctors, and explained to their patients.
There is mounting evidence that misleading lawsuit advertising leads
people to stop taking their medications or seeking treatment. According to the
FDA, doctors have submitted at least 61 reports of patients stopping their
prescribed anticoagulant after viewing a lawsuit ad, resulting in six deaths and333a
wide range of other adverse events, the most frequent of which was a stroke.
In testimony before Congress, doctors shared first-hand accounts of how
have harmed their patients and hindered their ability to
misleading lawsuit ads
334
provide medical care.

330

See CARY SILVERMAN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, BAD FOR YOUR HEALTH:

LAWSUIT ADVERTISING IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS 6 (2017).

331
332

See id at 14-18.
See id at 10- 3; see also Elizabeth Tippett, Medical Advice from Lawyers: A Content

Analysis of Advertising for Drug Injury Lawsuits, 41 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (2015); Daniel M.
Schaffzin, Warning: Lawyer Advertising May Be Hazardous to Your Health! A Call to Fairly
Balance Solicitationof Clients in PharmaceuticalLitigation, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 319 (2013).
333
See Letter from Anna K. Abram, Deputy Commissioner for Policy, Planning, Legislation,
and Analysis, U.S. Food and Drug Admin. to The Hon. Andy Harris, M.D., U.S. House of
Representatives (undated 2017).
334
See Examining Ethical Responsibilities Regarding Attorney Advertising Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 8-10 (2017) (statement
of Ilana Kutinsky, Director of Atrial Fibrillation Services, William Beaumont Hospital, Troy,
Michigan); Examining Ethical Responsibilities Regarding Attorney Advertising Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution,H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 10-12 (2017) (testimony
of Shawn H. Fleming, MD, Novant Health Vascular Specialists); see also Examining Ethical
Responsibilities Regarding Attorney Advertising Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, (2017) (statement of Dr. W. Frank Peacock, MD, FACEP, FACC,
Professor, Emergency Medicine, Associate Chair and Research Director, Baylor College of
Medicine, Houston, Texas) (submitted statement, on file with author).
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In addition, several studies and surveys show the troubling impact these
misleading ads have on patients. CDC-affiliated researchers have found that
videos on YouTube, most of which were lawsuit ads, convey scientifically
unsupported claims about the risk of taking anti-depressants and other drugs
during pregnancy. 335 A team of experts in female pelvic health found that women
who seek treatment often inaccurately believe mesh devices have been recalled
due to lawsuit ads.336 A recent survey of patients confirms that lawsuit ads scare
people away from medications treating conditions ranging from diabetes to
depression.33 7 A study also demonstrated that consumers shown two actual
television commercials soliciting lawsuits targeting the reflux drug Reglan-one
that purported to be a public service warning and another that clearly disclosed
its purpose as a lawsuit advertisement-found that those who viewed the ad
presented as a health alert were less likely to fill a new prescription or refill an
existing prescription. 338 Earlier, psychologists reported that patients stopped
taking medications to treat mental health conditions after viewing
a lawsuit ad,
339
resulting in relapses, hospitalizations, and suicide attempts.
The American Medical Association has recognized these types of
"fearmongering" television commercials pose a threat to public health.34 °
Organizations representing seniors have expressed similar concerns.3 41
Nevertheless, there is virtually no oversight of lawsuit advertising-not
from the FDA, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), or state bars. While West
Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 7.1 prohibits a lawyer from making "a
false or misleading communication," 342 this rule is insufficient to address
attorney advertising that presents misleading information about the safety of
drugs or medical devices. The rule applies only to misrepresentations "about the
lawyer or the lawyer's services. 3 43 It prohibits statements that create unjustified
expectations about the results that can be achieved, make unsubstantiated
335

See Craig Hansen et al., Assessment of YouTube Videos as Source of Information on

Medication Use in Pregnancy, 25 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 35, 39 (2015).
336
See Christopher F. Tenggardjaja et al., Evaluation of Patients' Perceptionsof Mesh Usage

in Female Pelvic Medicine and Reconstructive Surgery, 85 UROLOGY 326, 327 (2015).
337
See SILVERMAN, supranote 329, at 20-22 (presenting results of a May 2017 poll of patients
commissioned by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform).
338
See Jesse King & Elizabeth Tippett, DrugInjury Advertising, YALE J. OF HEALTH POL'Y L.
& ETHics (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract

id=3220066.

339

See Press Release, National Council for Community Behavioral Healthcare, New Survey
Shows Product Liability Litigation May Jeopardize Treatment Outcomes for People with Severe
Mental Illness (June 13, 2007).
340
See AM. MED. Ass'N, Resolution 208 (A-16) (received Apr. 25, 2016) (on file with author).
341
See, e.g., Leah Miller, Don't Confuse Lawsuit Ads that Look Like Public Service
Announcements, AARP S.D. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://states.aarp.org/dont-confuse-lawsuit-adsthat-look-like-public-service-announcements/.
342

W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 7.1.

343

Id.
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comparisons of the lawyer's services or fees with the services or fees of other
lawyers, 344 or inform viewers that there will be "no recovery-no fee" without
indicating that the client is responsible for payment of the costs and expenses of
litigation.345 Rule 7.1 does not extend to public health concerns resulting from
misleading or inaccurate information about a product or medical treatment option
conveyed in lawsuit ads. In addition, the West Virginia State Bar, Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, and Lawyer Disciplinary Board have no authority over
non-attorney entities that sponsor many of the commercials and websites.
Finally, disciplinary action is typically triggered by complaints filed by a client
who feels misled or by another attorney (alleging a competitor's deceptive
who
is not
advertising places him or her at a disadvantage).34 6 A doctor or patient 34
7
involved in the legal system is highly unlikely to file a bar complaint.
It appears that the last time the Lawyer Disciplinary Board considered
guidelines for attorney advertising on the internet was in 1998, when websites,
news groups, "chat rooms," and e-mail spain first proliferated,3 48 well before the
era of mass tort lead generation, YouTube, and social media. In 2006, the West
Virginia Bar's Lawyer Advertising Commission considered a number of
recommendations with respect to lawyer advertising, 349 but the 19-member
clarifying what constituted a "false
commission ultimately only recommended
350
and misleading" advertisement.
West Virginia should take additional steps to prohibit common
misleading practices in lawsuit advertising. For example, the legislation should
prohibit presenting a lawsuit advertisement as a "medical alert," "health alert,"
"consumer alert," or "public service announcement." Those who advertise legal
services should not be permitted to display the logo of a federal or state
government agency in a manner, suggesting affiliation with or the sponsorship
of that agency. Advertisements, whether on the internet, television, or print
media, should not contain the word "recall" when referring to a product that has
not been recalled by a government agency or through an agreement between a
manufacturer and government agency. All lawsuit advertisements should
344

See id. cmt. 3.

345

See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., State of W. Va., L.E.I. 96-01 (1998) ("No Recovery-No Fee"
Lawyer Advertisements Must Disclose Client Responsibility for Litigation Costs and Expenses in
the Same Advertisement).
See Tippett, supra note 331, at 40-41 (citing Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When
346
Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced
ProfessionalRules, 87 IOWA L. REv. 971, 1002 (2002)).
347
See id at 41 (observing that "non-client consumers ... may not be motivated to complain,

or may not identify state bars as an avenue for complaints").
348 See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., State of W. Va., L.E.I. 98-03 (1998) (Attorney Advertising
on the Internet).
349
See Tom Searls, Bar to Work on Reforming Lawyers'Advertising, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Mar. 15, 2006.
350
See Legal Group Won't Ban Boastful Ads, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, July 19, 2016.
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identify its sponsor and whether that attorney, law firm, or other entity will
represent clients, or refer those who respond to others. In addition, lawsuit ads
targeting FDA-approved prescription drugs should warn patients that they should
not stop taking a prescribed medication without first consulting with their doctor.
Violations of these requirements should be subject to the same remedies as other
deceptive business practices under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act.
The legislation should also empower the Attorney General to respond
when a law firm or lead generation company obtains, uses, or discloses private
health information for the purpose of soliciting patients to bring lawsuits. While
entities such as health maintenance organizations and insurers are subject to state
laws prohibiting them from disclosing private health information,3 51 these laws
do not reach attorneys, law firms, and lead generation companies, and firms they
may contract with to conduct cold calls soliciting people to bring lawsuits.
Finally, the legislation should make clear that it does not affect the
authority of the West Virginia State Bar, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Lawyer
Disciplinary Board, or the courts to enforce ethics rules and take disciplinary
action against attorneys when warranted.
This approach is fully consistent with the First Amendment and how
misleading advertising is addressed outside the legal marketplace. The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in Bates v. State Bar ofArizona352 that while a blanket ban

on attorney advertising is impermissible, "[a]dvertising that is false, deceptive,
or misleading of course is subject to restraint. ' '353 Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have upheld restrictions on attorney advertising that unduly influence
injured people354 or misled the public.355 The Court has found that "for
commercial speech to come within the First Amendment, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading., 356 Even where attorney solicitation
practices are not misleading, the Court has found that narrowly tailored

351
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25A-26 (West 2018) (health maintenance organizations); W.
VA. CODE ST. R. § 114-57-15 (West 2018) (insurers).
352
433 U.S. 350 (1977).

See id. at 383.
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978) (upholding restriction
on soliciting patients at hospitals or accident sites); see also Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Allen, 479
S.E.2d 317, 329 (W. Va. 1996) (holding West Virginia rule prohibiting lawyers from directly
soliciting injured people with whom they do not have a family or prior professional relationship
by phone materially advances a substantial government interest and that such activity is not
protected as the constitutional exercise of commercial speech).
355
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
650 (1985) (upholding discipline when attorney ad for med. device litigation said "no recovery, no
fee" when client would be required to pay litigation expenses).
356
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
353

354
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are permissible where there is a substantial interest in protecting the
restrictions
357
public.
In fact, the FTC has found these types of practices deceptive when used
in other industries, cautioned businesses from using them, and taken enforcement
action. 358 The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act already
generally prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 359 Legislation can
identify specific misleading lawsuits advertising practices that fall within this
prohibition. Such a law would address the substantial governmental interest in
ensuring that patients do not view advertisements intended to generate lawsuits
as providing medical advice, leading patients to forgo prescribed medications or
treatment options. Narrowly tailored legislation can directly advance this
interest, while protecting truthful commercial speech.
V.

CONCLUSION

The legislature should seize the momentum built over the past three
years to continue its achievements by addressing outstanding problem areas and
establishing the state as a leader in proactively tackling concerns. Some of the
suggested reforms, such as establishing an intermediate appellate court,
replacing West Virginia's outlier medical monitoring law with a more
mainstream approach, and allowing juries to consider seatbelt use, are long
overdue. Other proposals, such as by addressing predatory lawsuit lending and
protecting the public from misleading lawsuit advertising, present an opportunity
for West Virginia to lead.
Meanwhile, plaintiffs' attorneys will continue to push liability law at the
edges. While the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has accepted
invitations to expand liability in the past, it has recently shown sensitivity to the

357

See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1995) (upholding Florida Bar rule

that prohibited lawyers from sending direct mail to victims and their relatives within 30 days of an

accident or disaster).
358 See, e.g., FTC,

ENFORCEMENT

POLICY

STATEMENT

ON

DECEPTIVELY

FORMATTED

(2015) (recognizing that infomercials that mimic news reports can
be deceptive and requiring clear notice that it is a "PAID ADVERTISEMENT," citing cases taking
action when ads are presented a public service announcements or suggesting a government
affiliation, and actions challenging deceptive websites that purport to be an objective resource for
scientific information, but are selling a product). The FTC has also required advertisements that
make health or safety claims to be supported by "competent and reliable scientific evidence." See,
e.g., POM Wonderful LLC, 155 F.T.C. 56, 193 (2013), affd in part, 777 F.3d 478, 504-05 (D.C.
Cir. 2015); In re Telebrands Corp., 140 F.T.C. 278, 347 (2005), aff'd, 457 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2006);
In re Novartis Corp., 127 F.T.C. 580, 725 (1999), aff'd, 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
359 W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 46A-6-104 (West 2018). This prohibition expressly includes practices
that cause confusion as to the approval or certification of the goods or services, mislead consumers
regarding the affiliation or connection to another, disparage goods by false or misleading
representation of fact, or any other conduct that similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-102(7) (West 2018).
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potential consequences of doing so. For example, in McNair v. Johnson &
Johnson, the court adhered to the core principle that businesses are responsible
only for products they make or sell, not those made or sold by others. 360 It
"decline[d] to deviate from our traditional products liability law to extend the
duty of brand [prescription drug] manufacturers to those allegedly injured by a
competitor's product," joining the vast majority of courts. 36 1 The court found that
the alternative would increase the price of new drugs, stifle research and
development of beneficial products, and have negative health consequences for
society.36 2 In addition, the court observed that imposing new obligations through
tort law on an already heavily-regulated industry can "interfere in the delicate
3 64
363
The decision rejected deep-pocket liability.
calculus" set by policymakers.
McNair may indicate that the state's high court is less prone to adopting
novel theories of liability. As liability expansions occur and new abusive
litigation practices emerge,36 5 however, the legislature should continue to
maintain balance. Perceptions of the fairness of West Virginia's legal system will
not change overnight, but businesses are already taking notice of the state's
progress.

360

See McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 17-0519, 2018 W. Va. LEXIS 344, at *22 (W. Va.

May 11, 2018).
361

Id.

362

Id. at *31-32 (citing Victor E. Schwartz et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers

of Brand-Name Medicines When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe
Side Effects, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1842 (2013)).
363
Id. at *33.
364

See id. at *33-34.

365

While some states enacted comprehensive tort reform laws years ago, they continue to
respond to liability expansions and abusive litigation practices as they emerge. See, e.g., Michael
S. Hull et al., House Bill 4 and Proposition12: An Analysis with Legislative History, PartOne, 36
TEx. TECH L. REV. 1 (2005); H.B. 1774 (Tex. 2017) (responding to abusive weather-related
insurance litigation practices).
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